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WELCOME TO THE FUNHOUSE: THE
INCREDIBLE MAZE OF MODERN DIVORCE
TAXATION
BEVERLY I. MORAN*
The divorce tax laws affect thousands of American taxpayers. The
complexity of the current divorce tax system makes it difficult for couples
negotiating divorce or separation agreements to account for the tax con-
sequences of their settlements. In addition, the current divorce tax laws
intensify the economic hardship generally suffered by women after divorce
or separation.
In this Article, Professor Moran evaluates each system of divorce tax-
ation employed in the United States since 1913 and proposes a departure
from the existing scheme. She begins by reviewing the substantive provi-
sions of the various systems, focussing on how each system reflected the
lawmakers' views of women in marriage. Next she discusses the compli-
cations that arise from the existence of multiple systems. Professor Moran
then analyzes the roots of complexity and inequity in the various systems
and concludes by proposing a unitary divorce tax system that would be
more sensitive to the economic plight of alimony recipients.
As of 1986, for every two marriages, there was one divorce.'
But, while divorce may end a couple's marital relationship, it
rarely terminates their economic relationship. Instead, the di-
vorce settlement agreement may dictate that support payments
and property distributions continue for years. The tax conse-
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1986. A substantial portion of the factual material contained in this article appears in a
chapter entitled Alimony and Other Marital Support Payments in FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS by Professors Borris I. Bittker and Martin J. McMahon,
Jr. (Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 1988). The author would like to thank the following
individuals for their comments on draft manuscripts: Professors Borris Bittker, Jean
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they are only responsible for what pleases the reader. For research assistance and
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quences of these payments must be taken into account when
structuring a settlement in order to achieve the economic dis-
tribution intended by the couple-a difficult proposition given
the current divorce tax framework.
The current divorce tax system is a confusing conglomeration
of four different models. Congress has modified the divorce tax
system four times since the inception of the modern income tax
in 1913. Each wave of reform reflected society's changing views
of marriage as an institution and of spousal roles within mar-
riage. With three of the four revisions, however, Congress al-
lowed previous systems to remain intact by grandfathering prior
terminations under old law.2 As a result, four different sets of
provisions remain in effect today.
Each of the four statutory systems includes alimony in the
payee's income, allowing the payor a corresponding deduction.
Because most other distributions incident to divorce or sepa-
ration are not included in the recipient's taxable income,3 Con-
gress created a legion of complicated rules to distinguish spouse
maintenance payments from property distributions and child
support. These rules can be a trap for the unwary and, in many
instances, conflict with current trends in divorce law. A more
straightforward system of divorce taxation rules would enable
divorcing couples, many of whom have no tax sophistication,
to understand the tax consequences of their divorce settlements
and to negotiate settlements without expensive legal advice. 4
This Article examines the four systems of divorce taxation
and proposes a more equitable and straightforward system. Part
I discusses the basic requirements for each system, emphasizing
those requirements that reflect American society's changing
view of women in marriage. Part II explains which system ap-
plies to particular alimony and support payments. Part III eval-
uates the current multi-system approach in light of trends in
divorce law and concludes that a single unified system that shifts
the alimony tax burden to payors is preferable.
2 See infra Part II.
3 See infra Part I(B)(1)(c).
I For a discussion of the trend toward "do-it-yourself" divorce, see J. GREEN, J.
LONG & R. MURAWSKI, DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE 185-86 (1986).
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I. SYSTEM AFTER SYSTEM-A REVIEW OF THE ALIMONY
RULES
A. Till Death Do Us Part: The Early Years-1913 to 1942
The sixteenth amendment 5 ended controversy regarding the
constitutionality of the income tax.6 However, new issues soon
replaced the old ones. The question changed from whether Con-
gress could tax income to how income should be defined for
purposes of the tax. One of the first Supreme Court cases to
address this concern was Gould v. Gould.
7
The Goulds were legally separated before the institution of
the modem income tax. The separation decree awarded Mrs.
Gould alimony. After the enactment of the new income tax, Mr.
Gould suspected that the alimony arrangement had tax conse-
quences. Accordingly, he wrote to the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue to discover which rules applied.
The Commissioner responded that "alimony paid under final
decree, or under a decree of separation, is fixed and determin-
able annual income, and ... the person paying such alimony is
required to withhold the normal tax on same."'8 In other words,
the Commissioner believed that alimony was income to the
recipient and was therefore subject to the federal income tax.
Further, the Commissioner opined that "the amount of alimony
5 The sixteenth amendment provides: "The Congress shall have power to lay and
collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among
the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration." U.S. CONST.
amend. XVI.
6 The first federal income tax appeared during the Civil War to offset an enormous
national debt. Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, 12 Stat. 292, 309-11. Almost a year later,
Congress redesigned the tax, adopting a progressive rate structure. Act of July 1, 1862,
ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432, 473-75. Postwar agitation eventually led to the tax's repeal in
1872. Act of June 6, 1872, ch. 315, 17 Stat. 230. In response to populist pressures from
the emerging western states, the tax was revived in 1894 as a means of forcing the
wealthy to contribute more to the public fisc. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat.
509. However, the constitutionality of this tax was successfully challenged in Pollack
v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company, 158 U.S. 601 (1895). The Supreme Court held
that an income tax violated Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 and Article I, Section 9,
Clause 4 of the U.S. Constitution, which required direct taxes to be apportioned among
the states in accordance with the population. The income tax did not appear again until
the passage of the sixteenth amendment in 1913. See J. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAx 67-70 (1985); see generally D. POSIN,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 1-8 (1983), for a brief history of federal
income taxation.
7 245 U.S. 151 (1917).
8 Record at 4, Gould (No. 702) (Affidavit of Owen N. Brown, Commissioner of
Internal Revenue).
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paid cannot be deducted ... [by] ... a person paying such
alimony. "
Under the Commissioner's analysis, alimony results in two
taxes. First, there is a tax on the husband because he earned
the income. Then, after a portion of those earnings is transferred
to his ex-wife, the government imposes a second tax based on
her receipt of "fixed and determinable annual income." This is
a two transfer/two tax system, because each transfer (first by a
third party to the payor and then by the payor to the payee) is
viewed as creating income subject to tax.
In accordance with the Commissioner's opinion, Mr. Gould
withheld taxes from Mrs. Gould's monthly payments. That with-
holding reduced the net amount of each payment. In response,
Mrs. Gould sued Mr. Gould for alimony arrears. Because there
were no arrears if Mrs. Gould's alimony was subject to tax, as
the Commissioner suggested, the New York courts had to decide
whether alimony was income for purposes of the new federal
income tax.
Theoretically, the Commissioner's analysis had merit, be-
cause the receipt of alimony increases the wife's wealth and is,
therefore, income to her.10 Furthermore, the cost of alimony is
a personal expense and therefore should not be deducted by the
husband.II Despite the theoretical purity of this approach, how-
ever, the New York courts rejected the Commissioner's position
and instead determined that alimony was not income to the
payee, because "it is the duty of a husband to support his
wife.' 2 Accordingly, the courts reasoned, if support was not
income to the wife during marriage, it did not become income
91Id.
10 Cf. I.R.C. § 61 (1986) (subjects all income "from whatever source derived" to the
federal income tax).
1 Cf. I.R.C. § 262 (1986) ("no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or
family expenses").
An example of how the tax rules normally apply to compensation income will clarify
their application to the alimony case. Assume Homeowner earns $150 from her job.
She then hires John to help clean her house, paying him $75. The government taxes
Homeowner on her full $150 salary, not allowing her to deduct her payments to John
because they are considered personal expenses. In addition, the government taxes John
on his $75 (compensation income).
Alimony resembles the payment to John; it is not a gift, and it is made outside of the
family relationship, because the marriage has been legally dissolved. Thus, alimony
could reasonably be treated identically, that is, as income to the payee and no deduction
for the payor.
12 Record at 10, Gould (No. 702). This opinion was later affirmed in 168 A.D. 900,
152 N.Y.S. 1114 (1915).
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after dissolution, because the right to support continued even if
the marriage did not.
13
The U.S. Supreme Court accepted the New York courts' view
that Mrs. Gould was not subject to tax but did not decide
whether the payments were income to her under the sixteenth
amendment. 14 In addition, the Court approved the denial of a
deduction to Mr. Gould, because it believed that alimony is
founded on "the natural and legal duty of the husband to support
the wife. ' 15 Thus, the Court rejected the two transfer/two tax
system supported by the Commissioner in favor of a two trans-
fer/single tax model, which placed the entire tax burden on the
payor, 16 even when he was forced to pay over a portion of his
income as a result of the divorce decree.
Husbands reacted to the Gould ruling by developing schemes
to circumvent the holding. The most popular invention was the
alimony trust.17 In Douglas v. Willcuts, 18 the Supreme Court
eliminated the tax benefits of the alimony trust by holding that
husbands should be taxed on the income generated by the trust
property. The Court reasoned that the husband who was obli-
gated to pay alimony had income to the same extent when the
trust paid his alimony obligation as he would if he had received
the money directly and then paid it over to his ex-wife.19
3 Id. at 11.
14 Instead, the Court held that the federal tax statute did not apply to alimony, because
such receipts are not encompassed by the phrase "gains or profits and income derived
from any source whatever" as used in the Income Tax Act of Oct. 3, 1913, 38 Stat. 114,
166. Gould, 245 U.S. at 153. Although the Gould decision did not explicitly state that
Congress lacked the power to tax alimony, it was often understood to imply that alimony
did not constitute "income" within the meaning of the sixteenth amendment. The
Supreme Court reinforced this belief when it held in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189,
207 (1920), that the sixteenth amendment applied only to "gain derived from capital,
from labor, or from both combined."
1" Gould, 245 U.S. at 153.
16 In most cases the payor is the husband. Without loss of generality, the payor will
be assumed to be the husband.
17 This device was based on the principle that income from property is taxed to that
property's owner. For example, if a husband owned stock that paid dividends, and he
used those dividends to pay alimony, he was taxed on this dividend income under
Gould. See Gould, 245 U.S. at 153. But, the taxpayers reasoned, if the same stock was
placed in a trust, and the wife was the trust beneficiary, those dividends would then be
taxed to her, because she was the equitable owner of the trust property.
I8 296 U.S. 1 (1935).
'9 The Court based its conclusion on its prior decision in Old Colony Trust Co. v.
Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929). Old Colony concerned a taxpayer whose employer
paid his income tax as part of his compensation package. In that case the Supreme
Court held that the discharge of the taxpayer's obligation by a third party was income
to him to the same extent as if he had received the payment directly and then used the
proceeds to pay the tax himself.
For a discussion of alimony trusts under the Tax Reform Act of 1984, see Hjorth,
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Gould was the controlling precedent for twenty-five years.
The ruling comported well with a legal system that viewed
marriage as a permanent institution and which attempted to
discourage divorce by predicating all divorce decrees on proof
that one spouse was at fault for the dissolution of the marriage.
20
Until Congress enacted the Revenue Act of 1942, the courts and
the Internal Revenue Code treated couples as if they remained
married forever with husbands retaining a lifelong obligation to
support their wives. A couple might be divorced under state
law, but, under federal tax law, the watchword remained "till
death do us part."
B. If They Can Work in Factories: Alimony Rules fiom 1942
to 1984
As the United States entered World War II, the nation's need
for revenues increased dramatically. Accordingly, the main aim
of the Revenue Act of 1942 was to substantially enlarge the
public coffers. Representative Doughton (D-N.C.), who opened
hearings on the Act, set the tone by stating:
We are faced with revenue needs and a tax program of a
magnitude unthought of in modern times, and we all realize
it is necessary to raise every dollar of additional revenue
that can be raised without seriously disturbing or shattering
our national economy. Sacrifices never known before will
be required of every American citizen if we. are to carry on
successfully our war effort and our national defense pro-
gram, which, of course, we all are determined to do.2
In the midst of this fund raising frenzy, when the need to
"raise every dollar" was paramount, one might expect that the
Treasury would advocate the Commissioner's original assertion
to Mr. Gould that alimony was subject to a two transfer/two tax
system.22 Given the desperate situation, a two tax system would
have served many worthy goals: first, it is a sure way to either
increase tax receipts or discourage divorce; second, it is theo-
Divorce Taxes and the 1984 Tax Reform Act: An Inadequate Response to an Old
Problem, 61 WASH. L. REV. 151, 181-84 (1986).
20 For a discussion of the history of the fault-based divorce system, see J. GREEN, J.
LONG & R. MURAWSKI, supra note 4, at 15-35.
21 Revenue Revision of 1942: Hearings Before the House Ways and Means Committee,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1942) (statement of Rep. Doughton, committee chairman).
2 See supra text accompanying notes 8-11.
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retically correct;23 and third, it would address the concern of
some representatives that Gould rewarded heartless Jezebels
who roamed the country looking for alimony.
24
In these ways, the Commissioner's long-dormant position pre-
sented an ideal solution: tax both sides of the transaction and
benefit the war effort as well.25 However, the Treasury neither
suggested such a system to Congress26 nor recommended pre-
servation of the status quo. Instead, the Treasury proposed that
alimony be taxed to recipients with payors receiving a corre-
sponding deduction.27
This proposal presented several problems. First, the compel-
ling need to increase taxes would be thwarted by rejecting the
Gould approach in favor of the Treasury's proposed income
splitting. Under the Treasury proposal, the taxable income-
and therefore the tax liability-is shared between the former
spouses. Although both parties pay tax under this system, when
the progressive rate structure is combined with income splitting
between the former husband and wife, the total tax liability
declines. 28 This change was inconsistent with the revenue raising
thrust of the rest of the Revenue Act of 1942.
2 See supra note 11.
2 As Rep. Dingell (D-Mich.) opined while examining a witness:
He [the husband] is not only stuck for the alimony, but she might have been
an unscrupulous, scheming woman, who figured him out as being a sucker
worth that much in alimony before she ever married him, and then after she
gets the alimony it is just so much velvet for her, and she pays no income tax
on it. You say it is not income. Well, what is it? It is not outgo, is it?
Revenue Revision of 1942: Hearings on H.R. 7378 Before the House Ways and Means
Committee, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 2164 (1942).
5 The following example illustrates how efficiently the two transfer/two tax system
would raise revenues. Compare the results when a husband with $30,000 a year of
taxable income pays his ex-wife alimony of $12,000 a year. Assuming a 25% tax rate
on all taxable income, the total tax liability under the Gould system is $7,500 ($30,000
x 25% = $7,500). The entire $30,000 is taxed to the husband, while the wife gets a
complete exclusion of the $12,000 alimony. This is a two transfer/one tax system,
because, although each transfer (third party to payor and payor to payee) generates
income, there is only one tax.
Applying the same tax rate to a two transfer/two tax system, the total tax liability
jumps to $10,500 ([$30,000 x 25% = $7,500] + [$12,000 x 25% = $3,000] = $10,500).
The husband is taxed on his $30,000 earnings, and the wife is taxed on the receipt of
the $12,000 alimony.
26 See generally S. SuRREY, P. MCDANIEL, H. AULT & S. KOPPELMAN, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION CASES AND MATERIALS 17-19 (3d ed. 1986) (hearings on tax legis-
lation begin in the House Ways and Means Committee, with the Treasury Secretary
reporting the Administration's recommendations.).
2 Revenue Revision of 1942: Hearings Before the House Ways and Means Committee,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1942) (testimony of Randolph Paul, Assistant to the Secretary
of the Treasury).
28 Consider the situation in which the husband with $30,000 income pays his ex-wife
$12,000 alimony, but there are two tax rates: 25% on the first $10,000 of taxable income
and 50% on each additional dollar.
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Second, the fairness of the tax treatment of both parties was
questionable. From the husbands' perspective, the higher war-
time tax rates caused undue hardship. 29 Many congressmen
thought it unfair to force husbands to pay these higher wartime
taxes on money they no longer controlled. 30 However, when
combined with the progressive rate structure, the new provi-
sions upset the prior order to the detriment of both divorced
women and married couples. 3' Moreover, some critics claimed,
husbands did not need the benefits provided by the proposal
because judges already considered federal taxes when making
alimony awards. 32 Thus, any change would discriminate against
women who had negotiated awards under the old system. Fi-
nally, there was some concern that a tax on alimony was
unconstitutional.
33
Against this background of revenue needs, competing inter-
ests, and constitutional concerns, Congress might have post-
Under the Gould system, the husband is taxed on the full $30,000 without any
deduction for alimony paid, and the wife receives the full $12,000 alimony without
incurring any tax. Therefore, the total tax liability is $12,500, all of which is paid by
the husband ([25% x $10,000 = $2,500] + [50% x $20,000 = $10,000] = $12,500).
Under the 1942 Treasury proposal, the husband's tax base is only $18,000 because
his $30,000 income is reduced by the $12,000 deduction he receives for alimony paid.
His tax liability is therefore reduced to $6,500 ([25% x $10,000 = $2,500] + [50% x
$8,000 = $4,000] = $6,500). Although the proposal makes the wife liable for tax on
alimony received, her tax on the $12,000 is only $3,500 ([25% x $10,000 = $2,500] +
[50% x $2,000 = $1,000] = $3,500). Therefore, the total tax liability declines to $10,000
($6,500 + $3,500 = $10,000). Although both spouses pay tax under this system, the
proposal is still a two transfer/single tax model because the total amount taxed remains
$30,000. Under a two transfer/two tax model as originally proposed by the Commis-
sioner, the total amount taxed would be $42,000, which is made up of the $30,000 earned
by the husband plus the $12,000 received by the wife.
29 See H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 CB.
372, 409-10 (increased surtax rates would leave some divorced husbands unable to meet
tax obligations after paying alimony).
10 During the floor debate on the 1942 provisions, Congress was told: "The amount
of a husband's income which goes to the wife as alimony under a court order is in
reality not income to him at all since he has no control over it as the use to which it is
to be put." 88 CONG. REc. 6377 (1942) (statement of Rep. Disney (D-Okla.)).
3, If a husband and wife remained married and the wife had no independent source
of income, all the family proceeds were taxed to the husband, who was subject to the
progressive rates. From a tax standpoint, divorced couples did better than married
couples under the new law. See infra text accompanying notes 40-41.
32 See, e.g., Revenue Revision of 1942: Hearings on H.R. 7378 Before the House
Ways and Means Committee, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 2157 (1942) (statement of Benjamin
A. Javits, witness) (courts consider taxes when setting alimony payments; proposal
provides relief in excess of hardship).
33 The proposal raised a constitutional question as to whether alimony is income and
therefore taxable under the sixteenth amendment. It was not until 1950 that a court
determined that alimony is income under the sixteenth amendment. Mahana v, United
States, 88 F. Supp. 285 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 978, reh'g denied, 340 U.S.
847 (1950).
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poned any major reforms until after the war. Instead, Congress
was swayed by arguments that taxing husbands on income en-
joyed by their ex-wives was unduly burdensome, 34 and the leg-
islation based on the Treasury's proposal passed. 35 Further,
Congress ensured the statute a broad impact by making the
legislation retroactive. Thus, Mrs. Gould and all women simi-
larly situated became subject to this new scheme even if the
34 See H.R. REP. No. 2333, supra note 29, at 409-10; S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. 83 (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 504, 568-70.
11 The amendment requiring the payee to include alimony payments in income was
contained in Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 120(a), 56 Stat. 798, 816
(current version I.R.C. § 71 (1986)) and provided that a new section be added to § 22
of the Code:
(k) ALIMONY, ETC., INCOME. - In the case of a wife who is divorced or
legally separated from her husband under a decree of divorce or of separate
maintenance, periodic payments (whether or not made at regular intervals)
received subsequent to such decree in discharge of, or attributable to property
transferred (in trust or otherwise) in discharge of, a legal obligation which,
because of the marital or family relationship, is imposed upon or incurred by
such husband under such decree or under a written instrument incident to such
divorce or separation shall be includible in the gross income of such wife, and
such amounts received as are attributable to property so transferred shall not
be includible in the gross income of such husband. This subsection shall not
apply to that part of any such periodic payment which the terms of the decree
or written instrument fix, in terms of an amount of money or a portion of the
payment, as a sum which is payable for the support of minor children of such
husband. In case any such periodic payment is less than the amount specified
in the decree or written instrument, for the purpose of applying the preceding
sentence, such payment, to the extent of such sum payable for such support,
shall be considered a payment for such support. Installment payments dis-
charging a part of an obligation the principal sum of which is, in terms of
money or property, specified in the decree or instrument shall not be considered
periodic payments for the purposes of this subsection; except that an install-
ment payment shall be considered a periodic payment for the purposes of this
subsection if such principal sum, by the terms of the decree or instrument,
may be or is to be paid within a period ending more than 10 years from the
date of such decree or instrument, but only to the extent that such installment
payment for the taxable year of the wife (or if more than one such installment
payment for such taxable year is received during such taxable year, the aggre-
gate of such installment payments) does not exceed 10 per centum of such
principal sum. For the purposes of the preceding sentence, the portion of a
payment of the principal sum which is allocable to a period after the taxable
year of the wife in which it is received shall be considered an installment
payment for the taxable year in which it is received. (In cases where such
periodic payments are attributable to property of an estate or property held in
trust, see section 171(b).)
The amendment giving the payor a corresponding deduction was contained in Revenue
Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 120, 56 Stat. 798, 817 (current version I.R.C. § 215
(1986)) and provided that Code § 23(u) read as follows:
(u) ALIMONY, ETC., PAYMENTS. - In the case of a husband described in
section 22(k), amounts includible under section 22(k) in the gross income of
his wife, payment of which is made within the husband's taxable year. If the
amount of any such payments is, under section 22(k) or section 171, stated to
be not includible in such husband's gross income, no deduction shall be allowed
with respect to such payment under this subsection.
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alimony payments they received stemmed from divorces that
took place long before the enactment of the income tax.
The Gould system painted a portrait of women attached to
men, of women who could not support themselves and could
not even be expected to pay taxes on the support they received.
From this perspective, the 1942 legislation might be viewed as
democratic-a reflection of the independence women had
achieved in the workplace during the war. Yet, on reflection,
the legislation seems more to disregard divorced women's sit-
uations than to sincerely acknowledge their new place in Amer-
ican society. For example, although Congress was explicitly
concerned with the harsh effect of wartime tax rates on men,
Congress never considered the harsher effect of these same rates
on women who presumably had received smaller alimony
awards from courts due to the payee exclusion under Gould.3 6
Rather than reflecting a respect for women, the 1942 legisla-
tion instead gave women an Orwellian equality under the taxing
statutes. They were no longer treated like children who could
exclude their mandated support from income whether the mar-
riage survived or not.37 Instead, Rosie the Riveter took her place
beside men in the factories and at the Treasury.
1. The 1942 Act's Statutory Scheme
Once Congress decided to shift from the single taxpayer ap-
proach of Gould (in which the payor bore the entire tax burden)
to the forced sharing of tax liability between former spouses, it
had to decide which husbands would qualify for the alimony
deduction and what type of payments wives would have to
include in income. The 1942 alimony system provides that pay-
ments are taxed to the payee and deducted by the payor where
the payments: (1) are formalized by a decree of divorce or sep-
arate maintenance or a written instrument incident to such a
decree; (2) serve to discharge the payor's obligation of support
(as contrasted with gifts and payments settling the payee's prop-
erty rights); (3) constitute "periodic payments" (as contrasted
with a lump-sum settlement); and, (4) are not earmarked for
36 See supra text accompanying notes 29-32.
31 Under the 1942 Act, child support is taxed to the payor. 1942 Act § 22(k). This
treatment continues today under I.R.C. § 71 (1986).
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support of the payor's minor children.38 Although some of these
requirements were simply technical means of dealing with the
payor deduction/payee inclusion system, others continued to
reflect Congress' view of women.
a. Can this marriage be saved? The decree requirement. The
first issue facing Congress in 1942 was who would qualify for
the alimony deduction. The question proved difficult, because
income splitting was not widely available to married couples
until the joint return was authorized in 1948.39 Before the 1942
Act, all taxpayers, whether married, divorced, or single, filed
separate returns and were taxed separately on their individual
incomes. 40 The enactment of the new alimony rules, however,
gave the divorced the opportunity to income split. Because the
former husband's income was reported on two returns instead
of one, it was subject to lower marginal rates, and the overall
tax liability decreased. As a result, under the 1942 Act, couples
were better off for tax purposes if divorced instead of married.
41
To prevent exploitation of this opportunity to split income,
Congress limited the 1942 legislation to payments received after
an actual decree of divorce or legal separation. 42 Payments made
under a private separation agreement or pursuant to a court-
38 1942 Act § 22(k). For the text of section 22(k), see supra note 35. Under the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 the section of the statute dealing with child support payments
was renumbered as Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 71(b), 68 A Stat. 19,
which provided:
(b) PAYMENTS To SUPPORT MINOR CHILDREN. - Subsection (a) shall not
apply to that part of any payment which the terms of the decree, instrument,
or agreement fix, in terms of an amount of money or a part of the payment, as
a sum which is payable for the support of minor children of the husband. For
purposes of the preceding sentence, if any payment is less than the amount
specified in the decree, instrument, or agreement, then so much of such pay-
ment as does not exceed the sum payable for support shall be considered a
payment for such support.
39 Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, §§ 301-05, 62 Stat. 110, 114-16 (1948).
40 Although payees did not include marital support in income whether those payments
were made as a result of marriage or divorce, other types of income had to be reported.
Until 1948, these income items appeared on separate returns whether the earner was
married, single, or divorced.
41 Couples with two working partners had less incentive to divorce for tax purposes,
because they already split income due to the requirement that each person make an
individual return as opposed to the joint returns available today. For a discussion of the
joint return, see infra text accompanying notes 72-76.
41 The relevant language contained in 1942 Act § 22(k) provided:
In the case of a wife who is divorced or legally separated from her husband
under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance, periodic payments . .,
received subsequent to such decree ... shalt be includible in the gross income
of such wife, and such amounts ... shall not be includible in the gross income
of such husband,
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ordered support decree (for example, in the case of abandon-
ment without an accompanying divorce or legal separation) re-
mained subject to the Gould inclusion-by-payor/exclusion-by-
payee rules. 43
There were clearly alternative solutions to the problem of tax-
motivated divorce. For example, rather than limiting the ali-
mony deduction to court-ordered divorces and separations,
Congress could have allowed married couples to use joint re-
turns. This would have reduced the appeal of divorce as a tax
planning device. At the same time, the joint return would have
continued Congress' tradition of treating divorced and married
couples similarly, although single people would have received
different treatment for the first time. Furthermore, if Congress
had wanted to encourage marriage, as opposed to simply main-
taining equality between divorce and marriage, it could have
applied the Gould system to divorced couples and limited in-
come splitting to married people through the privilege of filing
a joint return. In this way, all the tax benefits would flow to
marriage, thereby completely eliminating the problem of tax-
motivated divorce.
Another alternative would have been to allow couples to make
their own decisions on reporting their income by extending the
income splitting alimony rules to informal support agreements.
For example, if it wanted to increase the bargaining power of
women within the marital relationship, Congress could have
extended the payor deduction/payee inclusion rules to payments
made under written separation agreements. These agreements
would have allowed wives to negotiate for fixed levels of sup-
port, which their husbands could then deduct.
By limiting income splitting to alimony payments resulting
from a court-ordered decree of divorce or separation, Congress
provided an economic underpinning for the stereotype that men
want divorces and women want to remain married. When the
benefits of income splitting are limited to the legally divorced
or separated, tax conscious payors are motivated to seek the
benefits of divorce, while tax conscious payees ask themselves:
"Can this marriage be saved?"
b. The net widens. Even after Congress approved income
splitting for divorced (but not married) couples, there was still
43 For an examination of which payments are still subject to this restriction, see hifra
Part II.
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the question of whether the new system would be retroactive
or merely prospective. If the changes were made prospective,
couples could bargain around the tax results of alimony pay-
ments. By making the payor deduction/payee inclusion system
retroactive, however, Congress took this power away from cou-
ples. 44 Payors, who were not forced to give up anything in
exchange for a valuable deduction, benefited from this system,
while payees lost income to taxes without receiving any other
form of compensation.
c. Jumping hurdles: getting in and staying in the system.
Another question raised by the new legislation was what type
of payments would fall under the deduction-to-payor/inclusion-
by-payee rules of the 1942 Act. After all, in addition to spouse
support, former spouses often make payments to an ex-spouse
as a result of gifts, sales, debts, child support, and divisions of
marital property. Congress could have allowed all of these pay-
ments to fall under the new alimony rules, thereby placing the
entire tax burden on payees. Alternatively, Congress could have
allowed couples to choose which payments would be taxed to
the payor and which would be taxed to the payee.45 Instead,
Congress decided to limit the new payor deduction/payee inclu-
sion rules to spouse support payments. As a result of this de-
cision, the prior treatment for all other transactions remained
intact.
46
Once Congress decided to limit alimony treatment to spouse
support payments, the question of how to distinguish these
transfers from all others arose. Because it decided to maintain
as much control as possible over the payor deduction/payee
inclusion system rather than allowing couples to shape their
own tax treatment, Congress had to develop detailed standards
to distinguish alimony payments from other types of
disbursements .47
44 1942 Act § 22(k). For the text of section 22(k), see supra note 35.
45 To a certain extent, this is the approach that Congress finally adopted in 1984. See
infra Section I(D)(1).
4 Specifically, divisions of marital property did not subject either spouse to the income
tax, child support was still taxed to the payor, gifts were excluded from the payee's
income, and sales produced gain or loss for the seller. The treatment of these payments
is discussed below. See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
47 Congress changed this prohibitive attitude in 1984 when it decided to create a
divorce tax system in which most of the decisions about how to label payments are
made by the couple. See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG.,
2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT
1989]
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Instead, Congress tried to increase its control by limiting the
alimony rules to spouse support and then enforced this limitation
by requiring payments to result from an "obligation to sup-
port. ' '48 In addition to the decree requirement noted above, the
legal obligation imposed on the payor had to arise "under the
decree or under a written instrument incident to such divorce
or separation. '49 This requirement served as a reminder that the
payor deduction/payee inclusion rules of the 1942 Act presup-
REDUCTION ACT OF 1984 714-15 (Comm. Print 1984) (purpose of 1984 Act is to make
rules more objective and easier to apply so self planning is encouraged).
4 Under the 1942 Act (and its 1954 amendments), payments cannot fall under the
payor deduction/payee inclusion provisions unless made in recognition of an obligation
of support. Except in the case of court-ordered support decrees, the statute does not
explicitly use the term "support," but it does require payments to be made "because of
the marital or family relationship," 1942 Act § 22(k), a phrase interpreted by the regu-
lations to refer to "the general obligation to support" and not to payments settling the
couple's property rights, such as the repayment of funds lent by one to the other. Treas.
Reg. §§ 1.71-1(b)(4), 1.71-(c)(4) (1957) (1954 Code §§ 71(a)(1) and 71(a)(2) not applicable
to property originally owned by wife unless received in contemplation of divorce or
separation for less than adequate consideration); see Wamack v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.
541, 550 (1979) (focus is not on support alone, but on "whether payments are for support
in contradistinction to being in exchange for the wife's release of some property inter-
est;" extensive review of facts and cases).
See also Hoffman v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1607 (1970) (acq.), aff'd per curiatln, 455
F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1972) (wife not taxed on payments for period after remarriage, since
husband's legal support obligation had terminated under Illinois law). But see Mass v.
Commissioner, 81 T.C. 112 (1983) (distinguishing Hoffman in situation involving Illinois
law and holding payments deductible by husband and includible in gross income of
remarried wife; payment agreement was made with both parties when both parties knew
of wife's intended remarriage, and Illinois law recognized husband's continuing payment
obligations despite general rule denying alimony to remarried spouse). Rev. Rul. 81-8,
1981-1 C.B. 42 (payments after legal obligation ceases are not alimony, but, rather, are
includible in ex-spouse's gross income under I.R.C. § 61); Rev. Rul. 82-155, 1982-2
C.B. 36 (support agreement was incorporated into divorce decree, which was sole source
of payor's obligation; pursuant to state law, legal obligation to make payments ceased
upon remarriage of payee; held, no deduction under I.R.C. § 215 for payments after
payee's remarriage; payments not includible in payee's gross income if payor knew that
obligation had ceased and facts otherwise indicate payments to be gifts; but if payor
was unaware of payee's remarriage, payments remain taxable to payee under I.R.C.
§ 61 despite payee's potential obligation to repay; Rev. Rul. 81-8 amplified and
superseded; disallowance of deduction under I.R.C. § 215 pursuant to ruling will not
apply to payments made on or before January 12, 1981). Rev. Proc. 82-53, 1982-2 C..
842 (guidelines for determining whether payments pursuant to decree of divorce or
separate maintenance are includible in gross income of payee and deductible by payor
under I.RC. §§ 71(a)(1) and 215, with sample clauses for inclusion in written instru-
ments; revenue procedure is effective September 7, 1982); see generally Regan &
Erbacher, When is "Alimony" Not Alimony Under Kansas Law?, 20 WASHBURN LJ.
495 (1981).
19 1954 Code § 71(a)(1). For the text of this provision, see infra note 76.
This "incident to" the divorce mandate causes problems, however, for payments that
continue to fall under the 1942 rules. For example, the Service has ruled that a post.
divorce agreement for support payments does not qualify for the payor deduction/payee
inclusion rules if no obligation to support survives the dissolution of the marriage. Rev.
Rul. 60-142, 1960-1 C.B. 34.
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posed legal compulsion and did not embrace voluntary
arrangements .50
Next, Congress devised a means of distinguishing property
settlements from payments of untaxed income. These provisions
ensured the integrity of the single taxpayer model, first pro-
pounded by Gould and then continued by the 1942 legislation,
by guaranteeing that income would not be taxed twice. 5' In order
to preserve the single taxpayer approach, the statute included
rules to distinguish payments of already taxed property (presum-
ably part of a property settlement) from payments of never taxed
current income (presumably alimony). Because it is often diffi-
cult to distinguish between property settlements and payments
of future income, Congress adopted the periodic payment rule-
a device that created irrebuttable presumptions. If a payment
was not "periodic," it could not qualify for alimony treatment.
52
The periodic payment rule is designed to separate divisions
of property from spouse support. The rule operates by taxing
the payee on transfers that qualify as periodic payments. 53 Con-
versely, if the transfer is not a periodic payment, the income
splitting rules of the 1942 Act do not apply. In order to qualify
0 See Baker v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 475 (1978) (deduction denied absent
evidence of legal compulsion).
SI To understand the concern, consider Rosie the Riveter who earns $100 in year 1.
Rosie is taxed on that $100 income in the year it is received. If Rosie then takes her
after-tax income and places it in a bank account, she should not be taxed again when
she withdraws her principal in year 10. The principal is not taxed in year 10, because
Rosie has already paid a tax in year 1.
If Rosie withdraws her principal in year 10 and transfers the funds to Spouse X,
however, X should be taxed on the receipt because he has never paid a tax on the
income generated to him by the transfer. See supra note 11. This is the two transfer/
two tax result that the Commissioner asserted when first considering the Gould alimony
payments. See supra text accompanying notes 8-10.
Using the two transfer/one tax model, X will avoid any tax in year 10 when he
receives Rosie's transferred principal, because Rosie has already paid the single tax
due in year 1. The transfer from Rosie to X in year 10 is treated as a part of a property
settlement incident to the divorce. Still under the single taxpayer model, a different
result occurs if Rosie transfers income earned in year 10 to X in that year. The reason
for different tax treatment is that Rosie has never paid a tax on these earnings, because
income is usually earned before a tax is due. When neither Rosie nor X has ever paid
tax on the income, the issue under a single tax model is whether to tax the payor (as
under the Gould model) or the payee (as in the modern approach). Since 1942, the Code
has imposed this tax on the payee and provided the payor with a corresponding
deduction.
52 The periodic payment rule, as enacted in 1942, did not clearly define the term
"periodic payment," though the rule did give examples of payments that would not
qualify as periodic payments. 1942 Act § 22(k), supra note 35. The 1954 Act included a
"periodic payment" definition. 1954 Code § 71(a), supra note 76.
53 The relevant language is contained at 1954 Code § 71(a)(1)-(3). See infra notes 76-
78.
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as spouse support, payments must be periodic, although they
need not be paid at regular intervals. A series of payments are
not considered to be periodic if they are merely installments on
a larger amount specified in the decree or instrument. The fact
that the decree requires a lump sum payment in a fixed amount
leads to the conclusion that the payments really constitute a
property settlement paid over time. Lump sum payments do not
qualify as periodic payments because they simply look too much
like property settlements.
However, the rule prohibiting deductions for lump sum pay-
ments is subject to an interesting exception. Even if the decree
requires a lump sum payment and even if the payment is char-
acterized as a property settlement by both husband and wife,
the payor is allowed a deduction if he transfers the property
through a series of payments that stretch over a decade or
more.54 Thus, husbands are rewarded with a deduction that
circumvents the underlying policies of the statute when they
arrange to support their ex-wives for a long period of time rather
than for a few years. This perpetuates the original view under
Gould that a husband's duty to support his wife continues for-
ever. The difference is that Congress preferred to use the carrot
of a deduction rather than the stick supplied by the Gould Court.
On the other side of the support versus property question is
the problem of how to deal with transfers of property that are
actually sales rather than mere divisions of marital property. At
the same time that the new divorce tax system was introduced
in 1942, the courts were grappling with the question of whether
transfers of appreciated property between divorcing spouses
should be considered taxable events. After some initial uncer-
5 The major wrinkle in the periodic payment scheme comes when these installment
payments are treated as periodic even though they amortize a principal sum. The
exception is known as the ten year/10% rule.
The ten year/10% rule starts with the directive that "installment payments discharging
a part of an obligation the principal sum of which is, in terms of money or property,
specified in the decree or instrument, shall not be considered periodic payments." 1942
Act § 22(k). The statute then provides an exception if the decree allows the payor to
fulfill his obligation over a ten-year period. The presumption shifts, and the formerly
excluded payments are brought back into the payor deduction/payee inclusion rules,
provided that no one payment exceeds 10% of the total amount due. Id.
For example, if the divorce decree requires a total payment of $100,000, five payments
of $20,000 each will not qualify as periodic because the total payments are to be
completed before expiration of the required ten-year period. If, however, the same
$100,000 is paid at a rate of $15,000 annually for four years and $5,000 annually for the
following eight years, $10,000 (10% of the principal sum) of each of the first four
payments and all of the remaining eight payments are periodic under the ten year/10%
rule. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(d)(2) (1957).
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tainty, at least two courts of appeals concluded that, despite
claims that such transfers were nontaxable divisions of marital
property, gain to the transferor was subject to tax. 5  This issue
remained resolved until 1960, when the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that transfers of appreciated property in exchange
for a release of marital rights did not subject the transferor to
tax.56 This decision led the Supreme Court to take its first look
at this issue in United States v. Davis.
57
Davis upheld the tax on transfers of property in exchange for
marital rights in states where the transferee had no vested in-
terest in the transferred property.58 This decision created a con-
flict in the treatment of these transfers, because community
property states gave a wife a vested interest in her husband's
property, while common law states did not.59
The Davis decision to tax exchanges of appreciated property
for marital rights supports the view held by the Court and by
Congress that spouses should be treated as a single unit for tax
purposes. Outside of the divorce context, this transaction would
result in two taxes. 60 The person transferring the property would
have a taxable gain of the difference between the amount real-
ized and his adjusted basis, and the person transferring the
marital rights would have a taxable gain on the fair market value
of the property received. 61 This is the classic two transfer/two
tax approach first suggested by the Commissioner to Mr. Gould
but rejected by the Supreme Court and Congress. Under Davis,
however, only the spouse transferring appreciated property is
subject to a tax on the gain; the spouse transferring the marital
11 See, e.g., Halliwell v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 740 (1941) (transfer of appreciated
property between divorcing spouses was not a taxable event, because the transfer
represented a nontaxable division of property), rev'd per curiam on this issue, 131 F.2d
642 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 741 (1943); Mesta v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A.
933 (1940) (same) rev'd on this issue 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S.
695 (1942), reh'g denied, 317 U.S. 704 (1942).
6 Commissioner v. Marshman, 279 F.2d 27 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 918
(1960) (transferor could not be taxed because the value of his receipt-the release of
marital rights-could not be valued).
370 U.S. 65 (1962).
53 Id. at 68-71.
19 The Supreme Court recognized this problem but refused to change its position. Id.
at 71. In fact, as the Court itself noted, there were other occasions when it had treated
couples differently under the federal tax laws depending on whether or not they lived
in a community property state. See, e.g., Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. Il (1930) and Poe
v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
60 See Rev. Rul. 59-47, 1959-1 C.B. 198.
61 The basis for marital rights would be zero.
1989]
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rights avoids tax liability.62 This spouse also receives a fair
market value basis in the property received, thereby ensuring
that there will never be more than one tax on the exchange. 63
The Davis ruling incorporates the two transfer/one tax ap-
proach that the Supreme Court created in Gould and that Con-
gress continued in the 1942 Act. However, as opposed to the
1942 Act, Davis, like Gould, places the tax burden on the trans-
feror rather than the transferee. In this way, Davis is at odds
with the congressionally created divorce tax system, which
places the tax burden on the transferee. 64
As a result of its decision to limit the use of the alimony
deduction, Congress also had to decide how to treat child sup-
port payments. On the one hand, the point of the 1942 Act was
to shift the tax burden of payments from the payor to the recip-
ient. 65 Given that child support payments are actually received
by payees rather than the supported children, there is some
foundation for the position that child support and spouse support
should receive the same tax treatment. On the other hand,
divorce does not terminate the personal relationship between
the supporting parent and child as it does the personal relation-
ship between the husband and wife. Thus, child support remains
a personal obligation of the payor and therefore should not be
deductible. 66 If one accepts that divorce does not end parents'
personal obligations to support their children, child support
should have the same tax treatment regardless of whether the
parents are married or divorced.
Congress decided to continue to treat married and divorced
parents equally by denying payors a deduction for child support
payments and allowing payees a corresponding exclusion. 67
62 Following the Davis decision, the Service issued Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 C.B. 63,
which opined that, where the wife receives property in exchange equal in value to her
marital rights, she is subject to no gain or loss and her basis in the property received
in the exchange is its fair market value.
63 If the spouse transferring the marital rights kept her zero basis, then there would
be a mere deferral of gain rather than a complete exclusion of the gain.
6 Despite this conflict, it was not until 1984 that Congress finally rejected Davis and
decided that the tax burden should be placed on the transferee. See I.R.C. § 1041 (1986);
see also infra text accompanying notes 168-177.
6 See H.R. REP. No. 2333, supra note 29, at 409; S. REP. No. 1631, supra note 34,
at 568-70.
6 The disallowance results from the general prohibition of I.R.C. § 262 (1986) and its
precursors, which disallow deductions for personal, living, or family expenses. Married
parents have never received a deduction for child support.
67 For the text of the Code's child support provision, see supra note 38 (1942 Act and
1954 Code) and infra note 147 (1984 Act).
HeinOnline  -- 26 Harv. J. on Legis. 134 1989
Modern Divorce Taxation
Consequently, from a tax standpoint, payees are better off if
they receive large child support awards and smaller alimony
payments. Of course, this advantage ends when the children
come of age and the payments are reduced.
Under the 1942 Act, child support is defined as payments
fixed in the decree or written instrument for the support of minor
children. 68 The 1942 Act also protects the payee from a tax
standpoint in the case of incomplete payments; if the payor
transfers less than the full amount of alimony and child support
due in any given period, the amount actually paid is first attri-
buted to child support. 69
Alimony trusts were also covered by the 1942 legislation; 70
the rules are fairly straightforward. Income from the trusts is
taxed to the beneficiaries even when the payments relieve a
former spouse of an obligation to pay alimony. Thus, the ali-
mony trust rules equalize treatment between payors who use
current earnings to pay alimony and wealthier taxpayers who
can set aside income producing property to satisfy their
obligations 71
C. "I'm Lucky, You're Lucky, We're All Lucky." - Expansion
of the Alimony Rules in 1954
From 1942 until 1954 the divorce tax system remained stable.
Couples who divorced or legally separated split their income
under the payor deduction/payee inclusion rules of the 1942
Act.72 Couples who terminated their marriages without benefit
61 See 1942 Act § 22(k).
69 Id. For example, if the decree requires $100 monthly alimony and $200 child support
and only $250 is paid, the first $200 is attributed to child support and only $50 is treated
as alimony.
70 See Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 171, 56 Stat. 798, 817, which states
in relevant part:
There shall be included in the gross income of a wife who is divorced or legally
separated under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance the amount of
the income of any trust which such wife is entitled to receive and which, except
for the provisions of this section, would be includible in the gross income of
her husband ....
The alimony trust rules are now contained at I.R.C. § 682 (1986).
For a discussion of alimony trusts under the Tax Reform Act of 1984, see Hjorth,
supra note 19, at 181-84.
71 Because income is attributed directly to the payee, the trust income is never
included in the payor's gross income. This eliminates the need to give the payor a
deduction.
72 For a discussion of the provisions of the 1942 Act, see supra text accompanying
notes 21-38.
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of a decree continued the payor inclusion/payee exclusion pat-
tern first established by Gould. Until 1948, however, all married
couples who were not legally separated were taxed in a manner
consistent with Gould: married couples were not allowed to
reduce their tax liability through income splitting, 73 whereas
divorced couples could reduce their overall tax liability by using
alimony payments to split their income. As a result, from a tax
standpoint, divorce was better than marriage.
In 1948, this anamoly was eliminated when the joint return
became available to all married couples. 74 From a tax stand-
point, the joint return makes the choice of marriage versus
divorce almost tax neutral because married couples receive ben-
efits similar to the alimony deduction.75 Further, the tax benefits
of the joint return are not limited to the happily married-a
husband and wife can hate one another or live apart and still
take advantage of statutory income splitting.
The joint return eliminated the 1942 Act's major inequity of
greater tax benefits for divorced couples than for married cou-
ples. Legally separated and divorced couples could split their
income through the payor deduction/payee inclusion rules of the
1942 Act while married couples could use the joint return. Yet,
when Congress adopted the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, it
broadened the payor deduction/payee inclusion rules in the new
section 71 to include informal marital terminations within the
alimony tax rules.
76
73 See, e.g., Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) (husband could not contractually shift
income to his wife for tax purposes). But see Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930)
(income splitting allowed when it resulted from community property laws).
74 Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, §§ 301-05, 62 Stat. 114 (1948) which was
codified at I.R.C. § 51(b) (1948). With limited exceptions, the joint return remains
available to all married couples. See I.R.C. § 6013 (1986).
75 In many cases, even with the higher rates for married people filing joint returns,
the payor will be better off with the joint return than with the alimony deduction. The
greater tax benefit flows from the fact that, as opposed to the alimony deduction, the
joint return is not limited by actual payments. For example, an ex-husband who pays
no alimony cannot get the benefit of the alimony paid deduction. Further, his ex-wife
will not include any phantom payments in income. But, provided that his wife signs the
return, a husband who leaves his wife to starve can get the benefit of a joint filing.
76 The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 renumbered every section in the statute, even
where a substantive provision remained completely intact. With the 1954 Code the
sections changed in the following manner:
1. The decree requirement originally contained in 1942 Act § 22(k) and discussed supra
text accompanying notes 39-43 became 1954 Code § 71(a)(1), which provides:
If a wife is divorced or legally separated from her husband under a decree of
divorce or of separate maintenance, the wife's gross income includes periodic
payments (whether or not made at regular intervals) received after such decree
in discharge of (or attributable to the propery transferred, in trust or otherwise,
in discharge of) a legal obligation which, because of the marital or family
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1. Expansion of the Alimony Paid Deduction under the 1954
Code.
Under the 1954 Code, payments made under a written sepa-
ration agreement, 77 or pursuant to a court ordered decree of
support, 78 became eligible for the payor deduction/payee inclu-
sion rules previously restricted to payments made under a de-
cree of divorce or separate maintenance provided that the other
requirements of the divorce tax law were met. Accordingly,
payments in abandonment cases, temporary alimony, and sep-
arate maintenance payments, which did not qualify before 1954
relationship, is imposed on or incurred by the husband under the decree or
under a written instrument incident to such divorce or separation.
2. The provisions excepting child support from the payor deduction/payee inclusion
rules originally contained in 1942 Act § 22(k) and discussed supra text accompanying
notes 63-69 became 1954 Code § 71(b).
3. The ten year/10% rule originally contained in 1942 Act § 22(k) and discussed supra
note 54 became 1954 Code § 71(c)(2). Section 71(c)(2) of the 1954 Code provides:
(C) PRINCIPAL SUM PAID IN INSTALLMENTS -
(2) WHERE PERIOD FOR PAYMENT IS MORE THAN 10 YEARS - If, by the
terms of the decree, instrument, or agreement, the principal sum referred to
in paragraph (1) is to be paid or may be paid over a period ending more than
10 years from the date of such decree, instrument, or agreement, then (not-
withstanding paragraph (1)) the installment payments shall be treated as peri-
odic payments for purposes of subsection (a), but (in the case of any one
taxable year of the wife) only to the extent of 10 percent of the principal sum.
For purposes of the preceding sentence, the part of any principal sum which
is allocable to a period after the taxable year of the wife in which it is received
shall be treated as an installment payment for the taxable year in which it is
received.
4. The deduction for alimony paid originally contained in 1942 Act § 23(u) was included
in Internal Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 215, 68A Stat. 71.
5. The provisions for alimony trusts originally contained in 1942 Act § 171 was trans-
ferred to Internal Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 682, 68A Stat. 234.
' 1954 Code § 71(a)(2) provided:
If a wife is separated from her husband and there is a written separation
agreement executed after the date of the enactment of this title, the wife's
gross income includes periodic payments (whether or not made at regular
intervals) received after such agreement is executed which are made under
such agreement and because of the marital or family relationship (or which are
attributable to property transferred, in trust or otherwise, under such agreement
and because of such relationship). This paragraph shall not apply if the husband
and wife make a single return jointly.
78 1954 Code § 71(a)(3) provided:
If a wife is separated from her husband, the wife's gross income includes
periodic payments (whether or not made at regular intervals) received by her
after the date of the enactment of this title from her husband under a decree
entered after March 1, 1954, requiring the husband to make the payments for
her support or maintenance. This paragraph shall not apply if the husband and
wife make a single return jointly.
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because they did not entail a divorce or legal separation, were
now subject to the original 1942 rules.79
Congress' stated intention in expanding the alimony paid de-
duction to include payments made as a result of separation and
abandonment was to end the perceived discrimination between
judicially divorced couples and those whose marriages termi-
nated informally.80 In operation however, the benefit ran exclu-
sively to payors rather than to the couple as a unit. Though
Congress limited the benefit to prospective agreements "to pre-
vent the upsetting of arrangements ... already ... worked out
with the understanding that the wife would not include the
payments in her income,"'81 the bulk of these changes benefitted
men at the expense of women by taking away a woman's power
to refuse to sign ajoint return. Understanding this result requires
a review of the 1948 Act and the impact of the joint return upon
married couples.
Prior to 1954, couples who terminated their relationships with-
out a formal divorce or separation were not entitled to reduce
their tax burden by splitting income. 82 However, after 1948,
couples who lacked a divorce decree could use the joint return
which provided the desired income split. These couples were
not denied the benefits of income splitting when Congress ex-
panded coverage of the alimony rules in 1954. Clearly, the ex-
pansion of the alimony rules to cover informal terminations was
not needed by most taxpayers. Instead, it only benefitted those
payors who could not convince their ex-spouses to sign a joint
return.
79 See, e.g., Korman v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 654 (1961), aff'd per curiam, 298 F.2d
444 (2d Cir. 1962) (temporary alimony taxable to the wife although no decree of divorce
or legal separation); but see Boettiger v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 477 (1958) (acq.) (New
Jersey separate maintenance order not legal separation and payment not deductible by
husband).
80 Under 1954 Code § 71(a)(2), payments made under written separation agreements
could fall under the payor-deduction/payee-inclusion rules of 1954 Code §§ 71 and 215
provided that the separation agreement was executed after the 1954 Act's enactment
date which was August 16, 1954. See infra text accompanying notes 208-209. Under
1954 Code § 71(a)(3) however, payments made pursuant to a court ordered support
decree could take advantage of 1954 Code § 71 so long as the decree was entered after
March 1, 1954 and the payments were received after the 1954 Code's enactment date.
Both the House and the Senate Reports on this matter state that the reason for
expanding the scope of the alimony rules is that restricting benefits to payments made
under judicial decrees of divorce or separation "discriminates against husbands and
wives who have separated although not under a court decree." H.R. REP. No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1954).
81 S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 80, at 10.
82 H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 80, at 10.
HeinOnline  -- 26 Harv. J. on Legis. 138 1989
Modern Divorce Taxation
Joint returns must be signed by both spouses. If one spouse
refused to sign, either out of spite or due to fear of liability,
neither could use the income splitting joint return. In those
cases, absent the amendments to the alimony rules introduced
as part of the 1954 Code, payors in informally terminated mar-
riages could not take advantage of either the joint return or the
divorce tax rules to reduce their income tax. Thus, the entire
thrust of the expansion was to help payors who could not help
themselves.
In the expansion of the alimony rules, Congress once again
focused on the problems of predominantly male payors rather
than on those of predominantly female payees. The major power
conferred on women by the 1948 joint return-that is, the power
to reduce the payor's tax burden or not by either giving or
withholding a signature-was eliminated by the 1954
amendments.
Congress appears to have been more even-handed in its de-
cision to restrict the new rules to prospective separations rather
than apply them to all divorced couples. In 1954, Congress
provided that payments made as a result of separations or court
ordered support decrees entered into prior to the change were
grandfathered in order to protect women whose arrangements
were based on tax-free alimony.83 The decision to grandfather
is not as sensitive to the needs of women as it first appears
however because a couple automatically brings its arrangement
under the payor-deduction/payee-inclusion rules by materially
altering a separation agreement after August 16, 195484 or by
modifying a court ordered support decree made after March 1,
1954.85
According to the 1954 Code, any material change will bring a
pre-1954 separation agreement or support decree under the 1942
rules. 86 Therefore, any increase in a payee's award will auto-
matically make all alimony subject to tax because a change in
the amount of an award is material.87 Given that awards tend to
3 S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 80, at 10.
94 Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(2)(ii) (1960).
81 Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(3)(ii) (1960).
6 1954 Code § 71(a)(2).
17 See Rev. Rul. 59-248, 1959-2 C.B. 31, 32 (a court's refusal to increase a provisional
alimony award does not constitute a modification of the original order and the the
amounts paid under that order are not includible in the wife's gross income under
section 71 because the court order was entered prior to March 1, 1954). See also Rev.
Rul. 56-418, 1956-2 C.B. 27 (where a written separation agreement was entered into
before August 17, 1954, but was materially revised after that date, the revised agreement
19891
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increase only modestly, the negotiating position left to the payee
is to fight to preserve the status quo. But this position becomes
untenable as inflation makes prior awards paltry compared to
the cost of living. Given the conflict between the parties, the
effect of the rule is to give payors more power at the expense
of payees because time and economic pressures will eventually
force payees under pre-1954 arrangements to agree either to the
alimony rules or the use of a joint return.
2. Requirements of the 1954 Code Regarding Income Splitting
Under the 1954 amendments, income splitting is triggered
when payments are made under three types of decrees or written
instruments. These are: (1) a judicial decree of divorce or sep-
arate maintenance; 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1954) ;88 (2) a written
separation agreement;89 or, (3) a court ordered decree for sup-
port.90 Thus, as opposed to the system which existed from 1942
to 1953, a decree of divorce or separation is no longer needed
for sections 71 and 215 to apply.91
For these purposes, a husband and wife are "separated" if
they live apart. There is no requirement of a formalized divorce
or separation. 92 In fact, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit held that a couple was separated for purposes of former
section 71(a)(3) 93 although they were living in the same house;94
will fall under the payor-deduction/payee-inclusion scheme). For the treatment of this
issue under Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 422, 98 Stat. 494, 795
(amending 1954 Code § 71), see Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-IT Answer 26 (1984) which
provides in part that a change in the amount of alimony, an addition or deletion of a
contingency, or a change in the time for which the payments are to continue are material.
83 1954 Code § 71(a)(1) (current version at I.R.C. § 71(b)(2)(A) (1986)).
19 1954 Code § 71(a)(2) (current version at I.R.C. § 71(b)(2)(B) (1986)).
90 1954 Code § 71(a)(3) (current version at I.R.C. § 71(b)(2)(C) (1986)).
91 1954 Code § 215 replaced that portion of 1942 Act § 22(k) which provided for the
alimony paid deduction. 1954 Code § 215 provides in relevant part:
ALIMONY, ETC., PAYMENTS: (a) GENERAL RULE. - In the case of a husband
described in section 71, there shall be allowed as a deduction amounts inclu-
dible under section 71 in the gross income of his wife, payment of which is
made within the husband's taxable year. No deduction shall be allowed under
the preceding sentence with respect to any payment if, by reason of section
71(d) or 682, the amount thereof is not includible in the husband's gross income.
92 Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(3) (1960).
93 The use of the designation "former" as applied to the cited Internal Revenue Code
sections under the 1954 Act should not be read to imply that a particular code section
is no longer applicable to payments received in 1988 and beyond. Rather, as pointed
out in the text, these provisions may still apply depending on the original execution
date of the underlying instrument as well as any subsequent modifications.
94 Sydnes v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 60 (8th Cir. 1978). But see Lyddan v. United
States, 721 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1983) cert. denied 467 U.S. 1214, reh'g denied 468 U.S.
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the record showed that this couple had managed their separation
by virtually never meeting face-to-face within their shared
home.
95
The "decree for support" requirement is satisfied by any type
of court order or decree which requires that a spouse make
payments for support or maintenance. This includes an inter-
locutory decree of divorce, a decree of alimony pendente lite,
a nonsupport decree in case of abandonment, and a decree of
separate maintenance based on extreme cruelty.
96
The purpose of the 1954 amendments concerning income split-
ting was to sidestep the decree requirement of the 1942 Act.
However, even under the 1984 and 1986 divorce tax systems, a
decree remains a prerequisite for alimony treatment where
spouse support payments are made despite the lack of a written
separation agreement or court-ordered support decree.97
1224 (1984) (rejecting conclusion of Eighth Circuit in Sydnes; phrase "separated and
living apart" requires geographical separation and "means living in separate resi-
dences"); Hertsch v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 703 (1982) (husband and wife are
not "separated and living apart" for purposes of Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(3) (1960) if both
live under same roof; even if Eighth Circuit holding in Sydnes that a geographical
separation is not required should be followed, it does not apply when parties share
common areas of house, do not anticipate divorce, and plan to remain in same house);
Washington v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 601 (1981), (Tax Court adhered to Sydnes with
seven judges dissenting despite reversal by the Court of Appeals for Eighth Circuit);
Del Vecchio v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 1153 (1973) (deduction denied where
taxpayer and wife lived under same roof, because state courts would not hold them
"separated and living apart.").
95 Sydnes v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 60 (8th Cir. 1978). This odd result is now
precluded for agreements executed after December 31, 1984, by I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(C)
(1986), which requires that legally divorced or separated spouses reside in different
households.
9 Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(3) (1960); Korman v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 654 (1961),
aff'd per curiam 298 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1962) (payments under an "order" rather than a
"decree" qualified); Rev. Rul. 58-321, 1958-1 C.B. 35 (abandonment); Capodanno v.
Commissioner, 602 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1979) (separate maintenance). But see Healey v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1702 (1970), aff'd per curiam, 28 A.F.T.R.2d 71-5217 (4th Cir.
1971) (not officially reported) (deduction denied for payments made pursuant to state
law obligation to support family, where judicial restraining order required taxpayer to
live apart from his wife but did not refer explicitly to support); Schaer v. Commissioner,
38 T.C.M. (CCH) 1191 (1979) (payments under a written separation agreement and
support order was taxable to the payee as alimony even though divorce terminated
support obligation under Pennsylvania law; under state law, order remains in effect until
spouse petitions to vacate it and obligations under separation agreement were contrac-
tual in nature).
97 In practice, the decree requirement rarely creates controversy except when one
spouse challenges the status of an ex parte decree. For example, in Estate of Borax v.
Commissioner, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that a Mexican divorce
satisfied the decree requirement even though the non-party wife had obtained a declar-
atory judgment in New York, where her husband was domiciled, holding that the divorce
and his later marriage were invalid. Estate of Borax v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 666 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966) acq.in result, 1968-1 C.B. 2,3 n.4 (acqui-
escence with respect to taxability of wife on amounts deducted by husband).
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3. Problems Created by the 1942 and 1954 Rules
The need to distinguish support payments from other types
of payments made the 1942 and 1954 rules difficult to apply.98
Courts attempting to separate support payments from property
settlements must consider a variety of factors and may not rely
upon labels affixed by the parties or used by state law.99 No one
factor is conclusive. On occasion, the courts have found that
payments were for support even though they had earmarks of
a property settlement such as a specified dollar ceiling and an
absence of contingencies.100 Conversely, some courts have char-
acterized payments resembling an ordinary support arrangement
as a property settlement.' 0' The periodic payment requirement
The Internal Revenue Service announced in 1967 that it will not follow the Borax
case as to a divorce decree held invalid by a state court of competent jurisdiction but
that it generally would not initiate the question of the validity of a divorce. Rev. Rul,
67-442, 1967-2 C.B. 65. But see Gersten v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1959)
(husband obtained ex parte Mexican divorce and remarried; held, joint return with new
wife not permissible, because former wife could annul divorce in California, where all
parties resided); Rev. Rul. 76-255, 1976-2 C.B. 40 (divorce to avoid taxes, followed by
prompt remarriage, disregarded as sham).
This issue is moot as to the decree requirement because the ability to fall under the
divorce tax rules through the use of a written separation agreement ordinarily comes
into play even if 1954 Code § 71(a)(1) or its 1984 counterpart, I.R.C. § 71(b)(2)(A) (1986),
are inapplicable for want of a judicial decree.
For cases where the Internal Revenue Service questioned the validity of a divorce in
which the issue was filing status, see Gersten v. Commissioner; Rev. Rul. 76-255; Boyter
v. Commissioner, 668 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir. 1981) (remanding "sham divorce" question to
Tax Court).
98 See Lynch, LR.C. Section 71: Breaking Up is Hard to Do, 20 DUQ. L. REV. 173,
198-223 (1982).
99 See, e.g., Taylor v. Campbell, 335 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1964) ("It is clear that the
labels attached to an agreement by the parties are not controlling.").
10 Schottenstein v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 451 (1980) (acq.) (although periodic pay-
ments to ex-wife were characterized and intended as property settlement, she had no
property interests that were not accounted for by other parts of agreement, and pay-
ments bore no relationship to husband's wealth or net worth increase during marriage;
held, payments constitute taxable support to wife and are deductible by husband);
Hesse v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 685, 693 (1973) (acq.), aff'd withoutpublished opinion,
511 F.2d 1393 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 834 (1975) (specified principal sum,
absence of contingencies, and security provisions, though ordinarily evidence of a
property settlement, are not always controlling, because they may merely indicate that
wife's bargaining position was stronger than husband's); West v. United States, 332 F.
Supp. 1102 (S.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 477 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1973) (support
despite fixed amount and duty to pay regardless of his death or wife's remarriage).
101 Bolza v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1138 (1981) (husband's payments to
discharge mortgage on house, originally in his name but transferred to wife as part of
divorce settlement, constituted nondeductible property settlement even though obliga-
tion would have terminated on her remarriage); Weiner v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 155
(1973) (payments allocable to property settlement even though terminable on wife's
death and subject to reduction if husband's income declined or ability to support children
would be impaired).
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might have reduced confusion in this area by providing an ob-
jective standard with which to test the property/support distinc-
tion. 10 2 Instead, it created its own set of problems.
For example, if a principal sum is not specified, the periodic
payment requirement is readily satisfied by arrangements that
call for payments at intervals until the payee's death or remar-
riage. 103 Indeed, following an important series of litigated cases,
the Treasury promulgated a "contingency" standard under
which payments qualify as periodic if they terminate upon any
one of several contingencies-death of either spouse, the pay-
ee's remarriage, or a change in either spouse's economic sta-
tus.'04 But the contingency standard is fraught with its own
complications. 0 5 Even when the contingency standard helps to
reduce the confusion, the periodic payment requirement remains
too difficult for the ordinary citizen to apply in a number of
typical situations. Thus the periodic payment standard is an
obstacle to the majority of divorced people who do not have
access to sophisticated tax advice.
As an illustration, consider the uncertainty caused by the
periodic payment requirement as it affects the marital home.
During many divorce proceedings, one spouse leaves the marital
home but retains title to the property. Is the fair market value
of the other spouse's rent free occupancy a periodic payment
subject to the payor-deduction/payee-inclusion rules? What
about mortgage or utility payments? Should all these transfers
be treated similarly?
Under both the 1942 and the 1954 rules, rent-free occupancy
does not satisfy the periodic payment rules because it involves
a single transfer of the right to occupy the property for the
stipulated period as opposed to a series of payments. 1 6 In con-
101 For a discussion of the periodic payment requirement under the 1942 Act, see
supra text accompanying notes 53-54. For the text of 1954 Code § 71(a)(1) (3), see
supra notes 76-78.
103 Where a principal sum is specified the payments may still be periodic but only if
they meet the 10 year/10% rule discussed supra note 54.
04 Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(d)(3) (1960) (payments for a period often years or less); Treas.
Reg. § 1.71-1(d)(4) (1960) (payments for more than ten years). For the origin of the
contingency test, see Baker v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1953).
105 For a discussion of problems created by the contingency standard see Note,
Alimony Taxation-The Contingency Doctrine Challenged, 9 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 156
(1971) (contingency doctrine has not promoted uniformity in the application of federal
income tax laws because it has not avoided state law variations or granted relief to
husbands paying alimony out of their current income).
'06 See Pappenheimer v. Allen, 164 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1947). But see Marinello v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 577 (1970) (holding payments are periodic where husband con-
19891
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trast, payments of utility bills and current repairs during a for-
mer spouse's occupancy qualify as periodic payments. 10 7 When
the payor retains title to the home, payments of mortgage prin-
cipal, property taxes, insurance premiums, and payments for
home improvements do not qualify as periodic payments be-
cause they protect the owner's interest in the property and
because the payments are made to third parties and not to the
occupant. 
108
If the occupying spouse retains or receives ownership of the
family residence, mortgage payments by the other spouse are
treated as alimony if those payments are not part of a property
settlement. 10 9 If, however, the occupying spouse receives the
family residence in trust for the couple's children, the mortgage
payments increase the children's equity in the house. Accord-
ingly, any incidental benefit to the occupant will not qualify as
a taxable payment to the occupying spouse." 0 When the hus-
band and wife retain joint ownership of their home, the treat-
ment of mortgage payments depends on the nature of the joint
ownership. Where the spouses hold the property as tenants in
common, payments on the mortgage are probably taxable to the
payee to the extent of his ownership interest in the property if
those payments meet all the other requirements of the divorce
tax system. "' When spouses hold property as joint tenants with
a right of survivorship, one spouse ordinarily escapes taxation
if the other makes payments on a mortgage for which the payor
alone is liable; but, if both are liable, one half of the payments
may be taxed to the payee.
112
Another complication arises regarding the treatment of life
insurance. Often a payor will purchase or maintain a policy for
the benefit of the payee. One might expect that, if the payee is
both the owner and the irrevocable beneficiary, the premiums
paid on these policies would be treated as periodic payments.
trolled the corporation-owned home which the wife resided in and husband made rental
payments on the home to the corporation).
107 Rothschild v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 149,153 (1982) (repair costs paid by husband
on cooperative apartment owned by husband are includible in the wife's income); Rev.
Rul. 62-39, 1962-1 C.B. 17,19 (where the wife is in possession of the property, utility
bills paid by the husband are periodic payments includible in the wife's income).
108 Bradley v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 701 (1958); Gentry v. United States, 283 F.2d
702 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
109 See Rev. Rul. 62-39, 1962-1 C.B. 17.
110 See Isaacson v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 659 (1972).
"I See Rev. Rul. 62-39, 1962-1 C.B. 17.
112 See Rev. Rul. 67-420, 1967-2 C.B. 63.
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Rather surprisingly, one court reached a contrary result in
cases involving term insurance policies. 1 3 The court noted that
the policy lacked any cash surrender or loan value and that the
wife's rights, though exclusive, were limited to the right to
collect the proceeds if her husband predeceased her during the
period in which he was required to pay premiums.114 Further, if
the payor continues to own the policy, he receives no deduction
for the premiums paid on the theory that the premiums increase
the value of the payor's retained rights.
i1 5
Other typical divorce payments are medical expenses, taxes,
and legal fees. If one spouse is obligated to defray the other's
future medical expenses or medical and hospitalization insur-
ance premiums, the payments may qualify as alimony.1 6 The
same is true of tax payments. Where one spouse is obligated to
pay the other's income taxes on the basic alimony payments (so
as to assure a net amount after taxes) the payments are taxable
to the payee and deductible by the payor.17 In contrast, the
payor's defrayal of the payee's legal expenses are not periodic
and so the payee need not include those amounts in income." 8
A not so typical payment is one made by the payor to support
the payee's relatives. Nevertheless, the regulations under the
1954 Act provide that "periodic payments described in section
71(a) received by the wife for herself and any other person or
persons [except their minor children] are includible in whole in
the wife's income, whether or not the amount or portion for
"I Wright v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 377 (1974), aff'd, 543 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1976).
But see Stevens v. Commissioner, 439 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1971) (economic benefit conferred
upon wife even though wife could only exercise rights with approval of divorce court);
Turpin v. United States, 240 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Mo. 1965) (husband allowed to deduct
premiums on both whole-life and term policies).
11 Wright, 62 T.C. at 398.
,,- Kiesling v. United States, 349 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 939
(1965).
116 See Rev. Rul. 62-106, 1962-2 C.B. 21 (payment of spouse's medical and dental
expenses was a periodic under the 1954 Act).
"7 Mahana v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 285 (Ct. Cl. 1950) cert. denied, 339 U.S.
978 (1950); Rev. Rul. 58-100, 1958-1 C.B. 31.
1,8 Baer v. Commissioner, 196 F.2d 646, 649 (8th Cir. 1952); United States v. Davis,
370 U.S. 65, 74-75 (1962).
As for the payor's legal expenses, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Gilmore,
372 U.S. 39 (1963) that legal expenses incurred in a divorce action are personal or living
expenses that cannot be deducted even though the husband's overriding concern was
to protect his income-producing assets against the wife's claims rather than to forestall
the divorce itself. But see Gilmore v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Cal. 1965)
(husband allowed to add legal expenses to cost of stock in determining basis on later
sale).
The cost of tax advice sought by the payor in connection with a divorce or separation,
however, is deductible. Rev. Rul. 72 545, 1972-2 C.B. 179.
1989]
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such other person or persons is designated."'1 9 Construing this
provision, the Tax Court held that if the husband was required
to make payments to the wife for the support of her relatives,
the wife was taxed as long as she was under a legal or moral
obligation to provide for the beneficiaries of the payments.
1 20
Child support payments are yet another area of controversy
under the 1942 provisions and the 1954 amendments. Under
those divorce tax systems, the payee is not taxed on any pay-
ment that is fixed as child support by the decree, instrument,
or agreement. 121 In Commissioner v. Lester,122 the Supreme
Court held that a divorce agreement reducing the amount pay-
able by the husband to the wife when their children married,
were emancipated, or died, did not "fix" an amount for child
support even where the allocation could be inferred from the
arrangement and state law might compel the wife to use that
* portion for the support of the children. 23 Instead, the Court
read the provision as "in effect giving the husband and wife the
power to shift a portion of the tax burden from the wife to the
husband by the use of a simple provision in the settlement
agreement," but only if the agreement explicitly earmarked a
specific portion of the periodic payment for child support.124 The
court's determination comports with Congressional intent to
retain control over the use of the alimony system.
D. "Starting All Over Again"
1. The 1984 Reform
By the time Congress seriously reexamined divorce taxation
in 1984, tax law in the divorce area was in a state of confusion.1
25
119 Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(e) (1960) (last sentence). During this period the regulations
and Code used the terms "wife" to refer to the alimony payee and "husband" to refer
to the alimony payor. This terminology was eliminated in the 1984 Act and replaced
with payor and payee.
120 Christiansen v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 456 (1973) (acq.); Faber v. Commissioner,
264 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1959). But see Emmons v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 728 (1961) aff'd,
311 F.2d 223 (6th Cir. 1962) (payment to the wife on behalf of her adult daughters is
neither includible in her income nor deductible by the husband).
121 1942 Act § 22(k); 1954 Code § 71(b).
1- 366 U.S. 299 (1961).
123 Id. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(e) (1960) (amount paid to support minor children
must be "specifically designated").
124 Lester, 366 U.S. at 304.
125 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1116 (1984). See also Tax Law
Simplification and Improvement Act of 1983: Hearings on H.R. 3475 Before the House
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Congress concluded that the alimony tax rules should be sim-
plified in order to make it easier for the parties to a divorce to
apply the rules and to reduce litigation. 26 Congress therefore
began its next round of reform with the intention of making the
alimony tax rules more objective.127
The intent of the 1984 divorce tax reforms, introduced as part
of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984,128 was consistent with
substantive divorce law reforms which assume a laissez-faire
stance toward divorce. 2 9 The major development in substantive
divorce law was the shift from a fault based to a no-fault based
divorce system. In 1971, the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws ammended the Uniform Mar-
riage and Divorce Act to eliminate the fault grounds for di-
vorce.1 30 In 1972, California became the first state to provide
"irreconcilable differences" as a grounds for divorce. 131 By 1984,
all states had provided for some form of no-fault divorce,
1 32
although many states also retained fault grounds. 133 The shift
from a fault-based to a no-fault divorce system made divorces
easier to obtain while the 1984 tax reforms simplified the settle-
ment negotiation process.
In addition to making the divorce tax rules simpler and more
objective, Congress wanted to give couples greater control over
the settlement negotiation process.3 4 However, the Treasury
asked Congress to maintain prior distinctions,'135 fearing that
unfettered taxpayer discretion would lead to abuse such as re-
Ways and Means Committee, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 203, 263 (1983) (hereinafter 1983
Hearings) (statements of M. Bernard Aidinoff, Chairman of the Taxation Section of the
ABA and Marjorie A. O'Connell, Domestic Relations and Tax Attorney).
126 H.R. REP. No. 432, Part II, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1025, 1495, reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 697, 1137.
127 Id.
,21 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984).
129 As author Lenore Weitzman states: "The new divorce laws adopt a laissez-faire
attitude toward both marriage and divorce. They leave both the terms of the marriage
contract-and the option to terminate it-squarely in the hands of the individual parties."
L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 368 (1985).
130 UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 305, 9A U.L.A. 96 (1971). According to
this section, "irretrievable breakdown" is sufficient grounds for divorce.
'3' CAL. CIv. CODE § 4566 (Deering 1972).
132 Freed & Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 219 FAM. L.Q.
417, 440 (1988).
133 E.g., ALA. CODE § 30-2-1 (1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § I (West
1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-2 (West 1987); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-4 (1986). Common
fault grounds include: adultery, abandonment, cruel and inhumane treatment, and ha-
bitual drunkenness.
134 1983 Hearings, supra note 125 at 163-64.
113 The Treasury was unwilling to abandon either the periodic payment approach or
the 10 year/10% rule which had added so much complexity to the 1942 Act. Id. at 153.
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characterization of child support payments or property settle-
ments as alimony. 136 This conflict between returning control to
taxpayers and restricting the use of taxpayer discretion became
the theme of the 1984 divorce tax reform. Over and over again,
the 1984 reform shows: (1) an increased emphasis on couples
engaging in taxplanning as a unit; and (2) a series of restrictions
that keep taxpayers from going "too far" in making their own
decisions.
For example, under prior alimony systems payments must be
periodic in order to fall under the alimony rules. 137 As a result,
a single cash payment can never fall within the payor-deduction/
payee-inclusion scheme. In contrast, under the 1984 system, all
cash payments are alimony unless the couple specifically des-
ignates that the payments are not alimony. 3 8 By making all cash
payments alimony, the 1984 system fulfills its mission in a num-
ber of ways. First, it reduces a fair amount of complexity; almost
everyone has a sense of the differences between cash and prop-
erty. Second, it gives control to the couple because the rule is
easier to apply than the periodic payment standard and because
both parties have to decide how to handle the payment. If a
couple chooses to transfer property, they know that the alimony
rules will not apply. If they negotiate a cash payment schedule,
they know it will fall under the alimony rules. This emphasis on
the couple negotiating its tax results is very different from the
older systems where choices were limited and often made by
only one spouse. Finally, consistent with the cash payment rule,
a transfer of property no longer qualifies as alimony under sec-
tions 71 and 215. The payor does not have to pay tax on the
appreciation and the payee takes a carryover in basis. 39
Congress tempered the discretion conveyed by the cash pay-
ment rule by adopting the complex front-loading rule of section
71(f).140 The front loading rule is designed to catch property
settlements disguised as alimony payments. It is analogous to
the lump sum distribution and 10 year/10% rules of the earlier
136 1983 Hearings, supra note 125 at 163-64.
117 See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
138 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 422 98 Stat. 494, 795 (amend-
ing 1954 Code § 71(b)(1)(B)).
139 1983 Hearings, supra note 125, at 163-64.
140 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 422 98 Stat. 494, 795 (amend-
ing 1954 Code § 71(f)) was itself revised as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
Accordingly, there are two front loading rules to contend with depending on the date
of the divorce or separation instrument under which the payments are made. See infra
text at Section II.
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systems. 141 The front loading rule prohibits alimony treatment
when cash payments are large in the early years but decrease
dramatically in later years. The rule is based on the same view
that supported the lump sum distribution and 10 year/10%
rules-that property settlements are made in large payments
over a short period of time while alimony is made in smaller
payments over a longer period of time. Today, however, alimony
is viewed as a short term means of getting women back on their
feet rather than as a life time support measure. 42 Diminishing
payments to the dependent spouse is consistent with the modem
view. Consequently, the front loading rule is anachronistic.
The 1984 reforms contain two other vital divorce taxation
provisions. First, the Davis143 rule, which allowed taxpayers to
whipsaw the government by failing to report transfers until it
became attractive to do so,' 44 was repealed so that all transfers
between spouses (and former spouses when incident to divorce)
were treated as gifts resulting in a transferred tax basis. 45 Sec-
ond, Congress continued its practice of grandfathering prior
terminations under old law by allowing couples living under the
1942 and 1954 Acts to move into the 1984 system. 146
In sum, the 1984 reforms maintain the basic structure of the
1942 and 1954 systems while making the rules more objective
and easier to apply. Where a marital termination falls under the
1984 divorce tax system all "alimony and separate maintenance
payments" are included in the payee's gross income. 147 As under
141 For a discussion of the lump sum distribution rules and the 10 year/10%, rule see
supra text accompanying notes 53-54 (lump sum distributions) and note 54 (10 year/
10% rule).
,42 See generally Malman, Unfinished Reform: The Tax Consequences of Divorce, 61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 363 (1986) (under modem concepts of alimony, spousal support is
designed to enable the recently divorced recipient to aquire new skills, revive old ones
and to reassimilate into the working world).
141 United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
244 1983 Hearings, supra note 125, at 162-63. For example, assume that W transfers
stock she purchased for $5 to H at a time when the property's fair market value is $100.
Under United States v. Davis, W should pay tax on $95 of income in the year of the
transfer. H now receives a $100 basis in the property received in the exchange. There-
fore, if H then sells the stock for $100 he will not have a gain or loss. This remains true
for H even if W has avoided a tax on her gain by failing to report the transaction.
115 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 421, 98 Stat. 494, 793 (amend-
ing 1954 Code § 1041).
146 Id.
,4 Unlike the 1954 A&, the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 did not change the num-
bering of Internal Revenue Code sections. However, as noted in the text, many provi-
sions were substantially changed despite the fact that they share the same section
number with an earlier provision. Further, even when a rule remained the same, its
place within the section was often changed. For example, the decree requirement which
was contained in 1954 Code § 71(a)(1) became 1984 Act § 71 (b)(2)(A). 1984 Act § 71
provides:
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prior systems, the payor receives a corresponding alimony paid
SEC. 71. ALIMONY AND SEPARATE MAINTENANCE PAYMENTS.
(a) GENERAL RULE. - Gross income includes amounts received as alimony
or separate maintenance payments.
(b) ALIMONY OR SEPARATE MAINTENANCE PAYMENTS DEFINED. - For pur-
poses of this section -
(1) IN GENERAL. The term "alimony or separate maintenance payment"
means any payment in cash if -
(A) such payment is received by (or on behalf of) a spouse under a divorce
or separation instrument,
(B) the divorce or separation instrument does not designate such payment
as a payment which is not includible in gross income under this section and
not allowable as a deduction under section 215,
(C) in the case of an individual legally separated from his spouse under a
decree of divorce or of separate maintenance, the payee spouse and the payor
spouse are not members of the same household at the time such payment is
made, and
(D) there is no liability to make any such payment for any period after
the death of the payee spouse and there is no liability to make any payment
(in cash or property) as a substitute for such payments after the death of the
payee spouse (and the divorce or separation instrument states that there is no
such liability).
(2) DIVORCE OR SEPARATION INSTRUMENT. - The term "divorce or sepa-
ration instrument" means -
(A) a decree of divorce or separate maintenance or a written instrument
incident to such a decree,
(B) a written separation agreement, or
(C) a decree (not described in subparagraph (A)) requiring a spouse to
make payments for the support or maintenance of the other spouse.
(C) PAYMENTS To SUPPORT CHILDREN. -
(1) IN GENERAL. - Subsection (a) shall not apply to that part of any payment
which the terms of the divorce or separation instrument fix (in terms of an
amount of money or a part of the payment) as a sum which is payable for the
support of children of the payor spouse.
(2) TREATMENT OF CERTAIN REDUCTIONS RELATED To CONTINGENCIES
INVOLVING CHILD - For purposes of paragraph (1), if any amount specified
in the instrument will be reduced -
(A) on the happening of a contingency specified in the instrument relating
to a child (such as attaining a specified age, marrying, dying, leaving school,
or a similar contingency), or
(B) at a time which can clearly be associated with a contingency of a kind
specified in paragraph (1), an amount equal to the amount of such reduction
will be treated as an amount fixed as payable for the support of children of the
payor spouse.
(3) SPECIAL RULE WHERE PAYMENT Is LESS THAN AMOUNT SPECIFIED IN
INSTRUMENT. - For purposes of this subsection, if any payment is less than
the amount specified in the instrument, then so much of such payment as does
not exceed the sum payable for support shall be considered a payment for such
support.
(d) SPOUSE. - For purposes of this section, the term "spouse" includes a
former spouse.
(e) EXCEPTION FOR JOINT RETURNS. - This section and section 215 shall not
apply if the spouses make a joint return with each other.
(f) SPECIAL RULES To PREVENT EXCESS FRONT-LOADING OF ALIMONY PAY-
MENTS. -
(1) REQUIREMENT THAT PAYMENTS BE FOR MORE THAN 6 YEARS. - Ali-
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deduction. 148 The term "alimony or separate maintenance pay-
ments" is limited to cash payments which meet four require-
mony or separate maintenance payments (in excess of $10,000 during any
calendar year) paid by the payor spouse to the payee spouse shall not be
treated as alimony or separate maintenance payments unless such payments
are to be made by the payor spouse to the payee spouse in each of the 6 post-
separation years (not taking into account any termination contingent on the
death of either spouse or the remarriage of the payee spouse).
(2) RECOMPUTATION WHERE PAYMENTS DECREASE BY MORE THAN $10,000
- If there is an excess amount determined under paragraph (3) for any com-
putation year -
(A) the payor spouse shall include such excess amount in gross income
for the payor spouse's taxable year beginning in the computation year, and
(B) the payee spouse shall be allowed a deduction in computing adjusted
gross income for such excess amount for the payee spouse's taxable year
beginning in the computation year.
(3) DETERMINATION OF EXCESS AMOUNT. - The excess amount deter-
mined under this paragraph for any computation year is the sum of -
(A) the excess (if any) of -
(i) the amount of alimony or separate maintenance payments paid by
the payor spouse during the immediately preceding post-separation year, over
(ii) the amount of the alimony or separate maintenance payments paid
by the payor spouse during the computation year increased by $10,000, plus
(B) a like excess for each of the other preceding post-separation years.
In determining the amount of the alimony or separate maintenance payments
paid by the payor spouse during any preceding post-separation year, the amount
paid during such year shall be reduced by any excess previously determined
in respect of such year under this paragraph.
(4) DEFINITIONS. - For purposes of this subsection -
(A) POST-SEPARATION YEAR. - The term "post separation year" means
any calendar year in the 6 calendar year period beginning with the first calendar
year in which the payor spouse paid to the payee spouse alimony or separate
maintenance payments to which this section applies.
(B) COMPUTATION YEAR. - The term "computation year" means the
post-separation year for which the excess under paragraph (3) is being
determined.
(5) EXCEPTIONS.-
(A) WHERE PAYMENTS CEASE BY REASON OF DEATH OR REMARRIAGE -
Paragraph (2) shall not apply to any post-separation year (and subsequent post-
separation years) if -
(i) either spouse dies before the close of such post-separation year or
the payee spouse remarries before the close of such post-separation year, and
(ii) the alimony or separate maintenance payments cease by reason of
such death or remarriage.
(B) SUPPORT PAYMENTS. - For purposes of this subsection, the term
"alimony or separate maintenance payment" shall not include any payment
received under a decree described in subsection (b)(2)(C).
(C) FLUCTUATING PAYMENTS NOT WITHIN CONTROL OF PAYOR SPOUSE.
- For purposes of this subsection, the term "alimony or separate maintenance
payment" shall not include any payment to the extent it is made pursuant to a
continuing liability (over a period of not less than 6 years) to pay a fixed portion
of the income from a business or property or from compensation for employ-
ment or self-employment.
148 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 422, 98 Stat. 494, 797 (amend-
ing 1954 Code § 215) provides:
SEC. 215. ALIMONY, ETC., PAYMENTS.
(a) GENERAL RULE. - In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as
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ments: (1) each payment must be received by or on behalf of a
spouse or former spouse under a decree of divorce or separate
maintenance, a written instrument incident to such a decree, a
written separation agreement, or a decree requiring support or
maintenance payments; 149 (2) the instrument must not designate
the payment as one to which the tax regime for alimony is
inapplicable; (3) if payments are made under a decree of divorce
or separation, the spouses must not be members of the same
household when the payment is made; and (4) there must be no
obligation to continue the payments after the payee's death. A
detailed explanation of each of these requirements follows.
a. Divorce or separation instrument. Under the 1984 divorce
tax system, payments are not alimony (and so are not taxable
to the payee and deductible by the payor) unless they are made
under a divorce or separation instrument. 5 0 This term includes
the same marital terminations covered by the divorce tax system
since 1954, that is, decrees of divorce or separation, written
separation agreements and court ordered decrees of support.'5 1
As under the 1954 system, the existence of a decree of divorce
or separation is rarely necessary, although the lack of a decree
may cause a problem in certain limited circumstances.15 2
a deduction an amount equal to the alimony or separate maintenance payments
paid during such individual's taxable year.
(b) ALIMONY OR SEPARATE MAINTENANCE PAYMENTS DEFINED. - For pur-
poses of this section, the term "alimony or separate maintenance payment"
means any alimony or separate maintenance payment (as defined in section
71(b)) which is includible in the gross income of the recipient under section
71.
(C) REQUIREMENT OF IDENTIFICATION NUMBER. - The Secretary may pre-
scribe regulations under which -
(1) any individual receiving alimony or separate maintenance payments Is
required to furnish such individual's taxpayer identification number to the
individual making such payments, and
(2) the individual making such payments is required to include such taxpayer
identification number on such individual's return for the taxable year in which
such payments are made.
(d) COORDINATION WITH SECTION 682. - No deduction shall be allowed
under this section with respect to any payment if, by reason of section 682
(relating to income of alimony trusts), the amount thereof is not includible in
such individual's gross income.
,49 1984 Act § 71(b)(2).
,5o 1984 Act § 71(b)(1)(A).
5I See 1984 Act § 71(b)(2)(A) (decree of divorce or separate maintenance or a written
instrument incident to such a decree); 1984 Act § 71(b)(2)(B) (written separation agree-
ment); 1984 Act § 71(b)(2)(C) (court ordered support decree).
,"' See supra text accompanying note 97,
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b. Designation as alimony. Under section 71 of the 1984
system, cash payments are includible by the payee and deduct-
ible by the payor, unless the divorce or separation instrument
designates such payments as outside the purview of sections 71
and 215.153 Thus, under the 1984 system, even cash payments
otherwise intended as property settlements are taxed as ali-
mony, unless the divorce or separation instrument specifies that
such payments are distributions of property. Similarly, pay-
ments provided as support are not taxed as alimony if the in-
strument so stipulates.
This provision places greater emphasis on the couple's stated
preferences. As a consequence, tax-related negotiations take on
increased importance. Payors may be more willing to give ad-
ditional concessions in exchange for valuable deductions. Also,
since couples together decide how payments are to be charac-
terized under the alimony tax rules by the designation of pay-
ments as alimony or a property settlement or by the transfer of
property or cash, payees regain some of the bargaining power
lost under prior law.
c. Obligation to continue payments after death of the payee.
Under the 1984 system, periodic payments are not alimony
unless the payor's obligation terminates upon the payee's
death. 154 Despite allowing couples to elect into or out of alimony
rules through the use of cash payments, Congress remains con-
cerned with property settlements disguised as alimony.1 55 Since
the dead need no support, payments that do not terminate upon
the payee's death are presumed to be part of a property settle-
ment. The requirement that payments cease upon the death of
the payee may be provided for in the divorce or settlement
agreement or supplied by state law or by oral agreement.
1 56
"c3 1984 Act § 71(b)(1)(B).
'54 1984 Act § 71(b)(1)(D).
I" See, e.g., H.R REP. No. 432, Part II, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 1496 (in order to
prevent deduction of amounts which are in effect the transfer of property unrelated to
the support needs of the recipient, the 1984 Act provides that payments qualify as
alimony only if the payor has no liability to make payments after death of the payee
spouse).
356 Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, failure
to specifically provide for the termination of the obligation in the divorce or settlement
agreement resulted in none of the payments being treated as alimony, whether they
were made before or after the payee's death. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1T(b) Answer
11 (1984). The 1986 Act's transition rules, however, altered this result, at least in some
circumstances. For divorce or settlement agreements executed after December 31, 1984,
termination of the obligation either by oral agreement or pursuant to state law remedies
1989]
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d. Child support. As under prior law, the 1984 system distin-
guishes payments fixed by the instrument as support for the
payor's children from alimony and separate maintenance 157 and
provides that child support is taxable to the payor and excludible
by the payee.1 58 But there are differences in the 1984 system
which attempt to address problems which developed as a result
of Commissioner v. Lester.159 Contrary to prior law, under the
1984 Act, payments are considered child support if the payment
period is determined with reference to a particular event in the
child's life. 60 This rule also applies if payments are to be re-
duced on a specified date that is "associated" with a particular
event related to the child.161 Thus, couples have more flexibility
in negotiating the specifics of their divorce settlements, but
cannot completely circumvent the alimony rules by merely la-
beling child support alimony.
e. Cash payments. One of Congress' primary goals in enact-
ing the 1984 Act was to institute a uniform federal definition of
alimony that would equalize treatment of transfers between
spouses and former spouses. 62 The 1984 Act makes compliance
with the alimony rules more straightforward by instituting a cash
payment standard to distinguish alimony from divisions of prop-
erty. 63 Congress intended this change to reduce the administra-
tive burden on the Internal Revenue Service and to make it
easier for couples to divorce. 64 The cash payment standard,
however, creates inequities when applied to transactions involv-
ing the family home. If a family home is owned either by one
spouse alone or jointly, the divorce settlement often provides
for the rent-free occupancy by the other spouse. Such a transfer
of the interest in the residence is not a "cash payment" and
the failure to provide such termination in the divorce or settlement agreement. Tax
Reform Act of 1986, P.L. No. 99-514, § 1843(b), 100 Stat. 2085, 2852.
117 1984 Act § 71(c)(1).
I'SS Id. For a discussion of how child support was treated under prior law, see supra
notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
159 The consequences of Lester are discussed supra notes 122-124 and accompanying
text.
160 For example, if payments to a former spouse will decrease when a child marries
or dies, each payment prior to the decrease is considered child support to the extent of
the decrease in such payment. 1984 Act § 71(c)(2)(A).
161 If, for example, a reduction is scheduled to occur on the child's eighteenth birthday,
the amount of the reduction is considered to be the amount of child support. Id.
162 H.R. REP. No. 432, supra note 155 at 1137.
163 1984 Act § 71(b)(1).
164 H.R. REP. No. 432, supra note 155 at 1495.
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hence its value is neither taxable to the payee nor deductible by
the payor. This treatment is consistent with the policy of not
taxing property settlements under alimony rules.
The cash payment standard also means that the spouse oc-
cupying the home rent-free is not taxed on the transfer. Although
there is no cash payment, rent-free occupancy is more like a
support payment than a division of property. 165 When the payor
is required by the divorce decree or agreement to pay for utili-
ties, insurance, repairs, property taxes, or mortgage interest on
the home, these cash payments may fall under the 1984 system,
assuming that other statutory requirements are satisfied.1
66
Many separation agreements provide that the payor spouse
must maintain an ordinary life insurance policy with the payee
spouse named as beneficiary. Prior to 1984, premiums paid on
a whole life insurance policy qualified as alimony while premi-
ums paid on a term life insurance policy did not. The 1984 Act's
cash payment standard eliminates this disparity. If the payor
spouse is required to maintain either a whole or term life insur-
ance policy on his life, and the payee spouse is both the owner
and the irrevocable beneficiary, the premiums are cash pay-
ments which fall under the 1984 alimony rules. 167
f. Transfers of property incident to divorce. Until 1984, trans-
fers of property between spouses or former spouses could have
very different tax consequences. If the transfer was a sale, the
transferor would recognize any gain and the transferee would
receive a stepped-up basis in the property. 68 A sale between
spouses resulting in a loss, however, would not give rise to a
deduction. 169 In an exchange, either spouse or both might re-
165 Consider the example of spouse A and spouse B. Upon dissolution of her marriage,
spouse A continues to reside in the family home which her former husband continues
to own. Under the cash payment standard, she pays no tax on the imputed value of her
rent. Spouse B moves into a $250 per month apartment which her former spouse is
required to pay rent in the form of alimony. Spouse B must pay taxes on this amount.
166 These requirements include: the payment must be designated as alimony in the
instrument; payments will not continue after the death of the payor spouse; and the
front-loading rules of § 71(f) are not violated. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1T Answer 2
(1984).
167 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-IT Answer 6 (1984).
163 See I.R.C. § 1001 (1986) (gain recognition); I.R.C. § 1012 (1986) (cost basis).
169 See I.R.C. § 165(c) (1986) (limited deductions for losses on sales outside the
business context); I.R.C. § 267 (1986) (disallowance of losses on sales between related
taxpayers).
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ceive nonrecognition of gain and loss. 70 A gift's tax conse-
quences would depend on whether the couple was married or
divorced at the time of the transfer.17' Moreover, in the divorce
context, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Davis172
that the transfer of property in exchange for marital rights was
a taxable exchange. In dicta, the Court stated that this would
be the result in most common law states, although it might be
a tax free division of property in community property states.173
In addition, differences among states in their definition of ali-
mony made tax planning problematic.174
The 1984 Act provides that transfers between spouses when
"incident to divorce"'' 75 result in no gain or loss to the transferor
whether the transfer is a gift, sale, or exchange and whether the
transfer is of separately-owned property or is a division of com-
munity property.1 76 The impact of section 1041, however, is to
complete the tax burden shift from payors to payees that began
with the 1942 Act. 77
A transfer of property is "incident to the divorce" if the
transfer: (1) occurs within one year after the date on which the
marriage ceases, or (2) is "related to the cessation of the mar-
riage."'1 78 Thus, a transfer made within one year of a divorce
need not be related to the cessation of the marriage in order to
escape taxation under section 1041. In making such determina-
tions, annulments and other actions which void marriages ab
initio constitute divorces. 79 A transfer is "related to the cessa-
tion of the marriage" if it is made pursuant to a divorce or
170 See I.R.C. § 1031 (1986) (nonrecognition of gain or loss for like kind exchanges of
property used in a trade or business or for the production of income).
171 There are no gift tax consequences for interspousal gifts if a transfer is in fact a
gift. I.R.C. § 2523 (1986). For an analysis of the basic requirements for tax-free transfers
of gifts between spouses, see R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAXATION 11.03 (5th ed. 1983).
172 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
173 Id. at 71.
174 See H.R. REP. No. 432, supra note 155 at 194-96.
,75 1984 Act § 1041(a)(1) (transfers between spouses); 1984 Act § 1041(a)(2) (transfers
between former spouses incident to a divorce).
176 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-1T(d) Answer 10 (1984). However, under 1984 Act
§ 1041(d), recognition of gain or loss is required (barring the application of another
nonrecognition provision) if the transferee spouse is a nonresident alien. In addition, in
order for § 1041 to apply, there must be a transfer of property as opposed to. services.
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-IT(a) Answer 4 (1984).
"n For a more extensive discussion of how section 1041 unfairly shifts the tax burden
to the payee spouse, see Lepow, Tax Policy for Lovers and Cynics: How Divorce
Settlement Became the Last Tax Shelter in America, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 32 (1986).
178 1984 Act 1041(c); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-IT(b) Answer 6 (1984).
179 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-1T(b) Answer 8 (1984).
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separation instrument, as defined by section 71(b)(2), and the
transfer occurs within six years of the cessation of the
marriage.1
80
By treating such transfers like gifts, section 1041(b) extends
the nonrecognition granted the transferor spouse by section
1041(a) to the transferee, who recognizes no income from the
receipt. The disadvantage of this income exclusion is that the
transferee must take the transferor's basis even if fair market
value has been paid for the property. 181
g. Restrictions on front-loading payments. Most of the com-
plexity associated with the 1984 system stems from the restric-
tion on "front-loading" alimony deductions. Front loading is the
transfer to the payee of large cash payments in early years
followed by significantly smaller or no payments in later years.
Because property settlements are more likely to involve a few
large transfers, while support is more often characterized by
smaller, more numerous payments, the front-loading restriction
is designed to prevent property transfers disguised as alimony.
Under the 1984 system, alimony payments are subject to two
provisions: (1) if the six-year rule is violated, the payments are
taxed to the payor; 182 and (2) even if the six-year rule is met,
certain payments may be "recaptured" resulting in their inclu-
sion in the payor's income with a corresponding deduction to
the payee.
(i) Requirement of six consecutive annual payments. When
the decree or agreement requires annual payments of more than
$10,000 per calendar year, section 71(f)(1) provides that the
payments are not "alimony or separate maintenance payments"
and, therefore, are neither includible in the payee's income nor
deductible by the payor, unless the payments must continue for
110 The only way to rebut this presumption is to show that the transfer was made to
effect a division of property owned by the former spouses at the time of the marriage's
cessation. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-1T(b) Answer 7 (1984).
18, Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-IT(d) Answer 11 (1984). Unlike I.R.C. § 1015 (1986)
which determines the transferee's basis for other gifts, the carryover basis required by
I.R.C. § 1041(b) applies whether the transferor's basis is less than, equal to, or greater
than fair market value at the time of the transfer and for purposes of determining the
transferee's loss as well as gain. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-IT(d) Answer 11 (1984).
'8 1984 Act § 71(f)(1).
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at least six consecutive calendar years. 183 Arbitrary application
of this requirement can produce counterintuitive results.
(ii) Recapture rules. If the 1984 system's six-year requirement
is met, the recapture rule will apply if payments decline by more
than $10,000 over three calendar years.184 The rule "recaptures"
all payments that exceed the lowest amount paid in a later year
by more than $10,000.185 This recapture requires the payor to
recognize gross income equal to the recapture amount and al-
lows the payee a corresponding deduction. 186
E. One More Time with Feeling-1987 and Beyond
In the Tax Reform Act of 1986,187 Congress cured many of
the ills associated with the 1984 system. The Act made the
alimony tax rules more straightforward by eliminating the re-
183 The six-year period begins with the year of the first payment and cannot end
prematurely without running afoul of the 1984 Act § 71(f)(1) unless the termination is
due to the death of either spouse or the payee spouse's remarriage. For example, the
six-year rule is violated if the divorce decree requires annual payments of $12,000 for
four years. Therefore, none of the payments are included in the payee's income even
if made for the payee's support and the payor does not receive an alimony paid
deduction. However, the same annual payments made over a seven-year period are
alimony even if they are part of a property settlement as long as the other requirements
of section 71 are met.
1" 1984 Act § 71(f)
185 The recapture provisions are shown below in an example which assumes a divorce
decree requiring payments of $50,000 in the first year, $30,000 in the second year, and
$1,000 in each subsequent year. In the second year, there is recaptured $10,000 of the
first-year payment (i.e., $50,000 minus the sum of $10,000 and the second-year payment
of $30,000). In the third year, there is a further recapture of $11,000 of the first-year
payment and $1,000 of the second-year payment, computed as follows:
Recapture in Year 2
First-year payment ..................................................... $ 50,000
Less: Sum of $10,000 and second-year payment ($30,000) ................. ($40,000)
Amount of first-year's payment recaptured in year 2 ....................... $ 10,000
Recapture in Year 3
First-year payment ..................................................... $ 50,000
Less: Sum of $10,000 plus amount recaptured in year 2 ($10,000) and
amount paid in Year 3 ($1,000) ....................................... ($21,000)
Amount of first-year's paymentrecaptured in year 3 ........................ $ 29,000
Second-year payment .................................................. $ 30,000
Less: Sum of $10,000 and third-year payment ($1,000) .................... ($ 11,000)
Amount of second-year's payment recaptured in year 3 .................... $19,000
Total payments recaptured in Year 3 ..................................... $ 48,000
6 Under the transitional rules adopted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the
recapture period for payments subject to 1984 Act § 71(f)(2) is reduced to three years.
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1843(c)(3), 100 Stat. 2085, 2853-55.
Accordingly, a payment of $1,000 in years 4 through 6 will not result in a recapture.
11 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
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quirement that the instrument state that payments will terminate
upon the death of the payee. In addition, the Act updates the
recapture rules to reflect the trend toward rehabilitative alimony.
Under the 1984 Act, payments were not alimony if the divorce
or separation instrument did not provide that the payor's obli-
gation would cease on the payee's death.18 8 This requirement
became a trap for unsophisticated taxpayers, particularly for
those who fashioned their own separation agreements or who
appeared before judges using standard preprinted forms for sup-
port orders. 189 The 1986 Act retroactively eliminated this
requirement.
Long before 1986, the view that husbands were permanently
obligated to support their wives, regardless of whether or not
the marriage remained intact, began to erode. The courts came
to regard alimony as a means of enabling women to become
self-sufficient after divorce, rather than as a means of permanent
support. 90 The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, approved
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in 1971, supports this view. The Act provides that a court
may grant a maintenance order for either spouse only if it finds
that the spouse seeking maintenance:
1) lacks sufficient property to provide for his reasonable
needs; and
2) is unable to support himself through appropriate employ-
ment or is the custodian of a child whose condition or cir-
cumstances make it appropriate that the custodian not be
required to seek employment outside the home.19'
Thus, the legal system began to expect women to become self-
sufficient once they were given the opportunity to develop job
I'l This requirement still appears in the temporary regulations at Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.71-IT(b) Answer 10 (1984), but has been superceded by transitional rules within the
1986 Act. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1843(b), 100 Stat. 2085, 2853.
189 Technical Corrections Act of 1985: Hearings on H.R. 1800 Before the House Ways
and Means Committee, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 324-26 (1985) (testimony of Marjorie A.
O'Connell, domestic relations and tax attorney).
190 E.g., Turner v. Turner, 158 N.J. Super. 313, 314, 385 A.2d 1280, 1282 (1978);
Molnar v. Molnar, 314 S.E.2d 73 (W. Va. Ct. App. 1984); Cathleen C.Q. v. Norman
C.Q., 452 A.2d 951 (Del. Supr. 1982) (basic purpose of Deleware Divorce and Annulment
Act to award alimony only during continuation of dependency and in manner which will
encourage parties to become self-supporting).
' UNIF. MARRIAGE & DivoRcE AcT § 308, 9A U.L.A. 147 (1987). Many states
adopted the Uniform Act's approach: e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.200 (1984), Mo.
Rnv. STAT. § 452.33 (1986).
1989]
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skills. Temporary alimony, often referred to as "rehabilitative"
alimony, became standard.1 92
The 1984 front-loading rules, which provided for a six-year
recapture period, were inconsistent with the move toward re-
habilitative alimony. Under the 1984 Act, for example, payments
made in years 4 and beyond might be subject to recapture. The
1986 Act shortened the recapture period to three years and made
the change retrospective for payments subject to the 1984 sys-
tem.193 More complicated changes in the front-loading rules,
however, were made prospectively. 194
Finally, the 1984 Act originally required payments over a six-
year period before any amount was deductible by the payor.
The 1986 divorce tax system eliminated the possibility that pay-
ments would fall outside the payor deduction/payee inclusion
rules under the 1984 or 1986 Acts merely because payments
were not made over a six-year period.195 Instead, the only pen-
192 See Krauskopf, Rehabilitative Alimony: Uses and Abuses of Limited Duration
Alimony, 21 FAM. L.Q. 573 (1988), for a discussion of how the trend toward rehabili-
tative alimony has impacted the economic well-being of divorced women.
193 I.R.C. § 71(f) (1986).
194 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1843(c)(2), (3), 100 Stat. 2085.
195 I.R.C. § 71(f) (1986) provides:
(f) RECOMPUTATION WHERE EXCESS FRONT-LOADING OF ALIMONY PAYMENTS. -
(1) IN GENERAL. - If there are excess alimony payments -
(A) the payor spouse shall include the amount of such excess payments in gross
income for the payor spouse's taxable year beginning in the 3rd post-separation year,
and
(B) the payee spouse shall be allowed a deduction in computing adjusted gross
income for the amount of such excess payments for the payee's taxable year beginning
in the 3rd post-separation year.
(2) ExcEss ALIMONY PAYMENTS. - For purposes of this subsection, the term "excess
alimony payments" mean the sum of -
(A) the excess payments for the Ist post-separation year, and
(B) the excess payments for the 2nd post-separation year.
(3) ExcEss PAYMENTS FOR 1ST POST-SEPARATION YEAR. - For purposes of this
subsection, the amount of the excess payments for the Ist post-separation year is the
excess (if any) of -
(A) the amount of the alimony or separate maintenance payments paid by the payor
spouse during the Ist post separation year, over
(B) the sum of-
(i) the average of -
(I) the alimony or separate maintenance payments paid by the payor spouse
during the 2nd post-separation year, reduced by the excess payments for the 2nd post-
separation year, and
(II) the alimony or separate maintenance payments paid by the payor spouse
during the 3rd post-separation year, plus
(ii) $15,000.
(4) ExcEss PAYMENTS FOR 2ND POST-SEPARATION YEAR. - For purposes of this
subsection, the amount of the excess payments for the 2nd post-separation year is the
excess (if any) of-
(A) the amount of the alimony or separate maintenance payments paid by the payor
spouse during the 2nd post separation year, over
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alty for failure to comply with the 1986 front-loading rules is the
possible recapture of excess payments. This recapture, which
first appeared in the 1984 Act, forces a payor to include previ-
ously deducted excess alimony payments.' 96 In addition, the
1986 front-loading rules replace the $10,000 recapture threshold
in the 1984 system with a $15,000 excess amount and replace
the 1984 Act's year-by-year recapture with a single recapture of
the combined "excess payments" from the first and second year
in the third year. 197 This change was prospective only.
(B) the sum of-
(i) the amount of the alimony or separate maintenance payments paid by the
payor spouse during the 3rd post-separation year, plus
(ii) $15,000.
(5) EXCEPTIONS. -
(A) WHERE PAYMENT CEASES BY REASON OF DEATH OR REMARRIAGE. - Para-
graph (1) shall not apply if-
(i) either spouse dies before the close of the 3rd post-separation year, or the
payee spouse remarries before the close of the 3rd post-separation year, and
(ii) the alimony or separate maintenance payments cease by reason of such death
or remarriage.
(B) SUPPORT PAYMENTS. - For purposes of this subsection, the term "alimony or
separate maintenance payment" shall not include any payment received under a decree
described in subsection (b)(2)(C).
(C) FLUCTUATING PAYMENTS NOT WITHIN CONTROL OF PAYOR SPOUSE. - For
purposes of this subsection, the term "alimony or separate maintenance payment" shall
not include any payment to the extent it is made pursuant to a continuing liability (over
a period of not less than 3 years) to pay a fixed portion or portions of the income from
a business or property or from compensation for employment or self-employment.
(6) POST-SEPARATION YEARS. - For purposes of this subsection, the term "1st post-
separation years" means the 1st calendar year in which the payor spouse paid to the
payee spouse alimony or separate maintenance payments to which this section applies.
The 2nd and 3rd post-separation years shall be the 1st and 2nd succeeding calendar
years, respectively.
(g) CROSS REFERENCES. -
(1) For deduction of alimony or separate maintenance payments, see section 215.
(2) For taxable status of income of an estate or trust in the case of divorce, etc., see
section 682.
'96 1984 Act § 71(f).
'- I.R.C. § 71(f) (1986). "Excess payments" for the first post-separation year are the
amount by which payments in the first calendar year in which alimony or separate
support payments were made exceed the sum of $15,000 plus the average of(a) payments
for the second post-separation year minus excess payments for that year, and
(b) payments for the third post-separation year. Excess payments for the second post-
separation year are the amount that payments in the second post-separation year exceed
the sum of $15,000 plus payments made in the third post separation year. No recom-
putation is required if payments do not decline by $15,000 or more per year.
This change under the 1986 divorce tax system is shown in the example below. The
example assumes a $50,000 payment in the first year, a $30,000 payment in the second
year and a $1,000 payment in the third year.
Excess payment for the second year
Second-year payment .................................................. $ 30,000
Less: Sum of $15,000 and third-year payment ($1,000) .................... ($ 16,000)
HeinOnline  -- 26 Harv. J. on Legis. 161 1989
Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 26:117
II. WHO Is TAXED UNDER WHAT SYSTEM? EFFECTIVE DATES
The most complex aspect of divorce taxation is the multitude
of effective dates for various provisions. The reason for this
complexity is two-fold. First, Congress periodically revised sev-
eral important divorce tax provisions. Statutory reform is fairly
common; but, in addition to updating the divorce tax system for
dissolutions occurring after each change, Congress grandfath-
ered prior terminations under older rules. Further, Congress
allowed couples who divorced under one set of rules to move
forward into more recent systems, but prohibited couples from
electing back into older systems. As a result, currently there
are couples making and receiving identical payments, but re-
ceiving different tax treatment depending on the year of their
divorce. 19
At first blush, it might seem that Congress intended to avoid
overlapping systems, even if this meant hardship for taxpayers
who would have to adjust their settlements to reflect a change
in the law. Such adjustment was made necessary, for example,
by the 1942 revisions to the divorce tax system which were
imposed on all payments made under a decree of divorce or
separation, even if the decree was entered before passage of the
1942 Act. 199 But, Congress created overlap. The 1942 Act con-
tinues to remain in effect for some payments made under de-
Excess paympnt ....................................................... $14,000
Excess payment for first year
First-year payment ..................................................... $ 50,000
Less: Surn of $15,000 and average of (a) second-year payment ($30,000)
minus excess payment from second-year ($14,000) plus (b) third-year
payment ($1,000)...................................................($23,500)
Excess payment . .................................................... $ 26,500
As a result of the I.R.C. § 71(f) (1986) recapture computation, the payor includes
$40,500 in income in the third year and the payee deducts the same amount.
These computations are not required if a decline in payments over the three-year
period is due to the death of either spouse or the remarriage of the payee spouse. I.R.C.
§ 71(f)(a)(5) (1986). Section 71(f)(5)(C) also excludes payments made as a result of a
continuing liability to pay a fixed amount.
"9 To illustrate the difference in treatment under the different systems, consider three
couples, one divorced in 1983, the second divorced in 1985 and the third divorced in
1987, The disparity in treatment among the couples is significant. In order to come
under the payor deduction/payee inclusion rules, payments under the 1983 divorce must
satisfy different requirements than payments made under the 1985 decree. 1985 divorce
payments must meet different tests than those applicable to the 1987 divorce. In addition,
with the grandfathering of old terminations and the ability to elect forward but not back,
the couple divorced in 1983 can choose among three systems; the couple divorced in
1985 can choose between two systems; but the 1987 divorce has only one option.
199 Id.
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crees of divorce or separation entered into before January 1,
1985.200 The first disharmony occurred in 1954 when Congress
expanded the 1942 provisions to include marital dissolutions
which did not result in court sanctioned divorce or separation. 20 1
Until 1954, those payments remained subject to Gould. In order
to protect taxpayer expectations, the 1954 expansion only ap-
plied to terminations made after 1953 .202 Thus, Congress created
the first systemic disparity. Some but not all dissolutions were
affected based solely on the timing of the divorce.
Each subsequent alimony tax reform grandfathered prior ter-
minations under prior law, while requiring that alimony pay-
ments resulting from more recent dissolutions be made under
new rules. Consequently, there are now three divorce tax sys-
tems for payments made under a decree of divorce or separation
and four systems for payments made under informal separations
and court ordered support decrees.
A. Payments Made Under a Decree of Divorce or Separation
Payments made under court sanctioned decrees of divorce or
separation are taxed under one of three systems. Which system
applies depends on the date of the original decree and the date
of any relevant modification.
All payments made under court ordered decrees of divorce
or separation fall under the provisions of the 1942 Act so long
as the decree was entered before January 1, 1985 and the couple
failed to modify the decree in order to bring it within the pro-
visions of later Acts. 203 Where the decree of divorce or separa-
tion is dated between January 1, 1985 and December 31, 1986,
however, payments fall under the 1984 rules unless the couple
maneuvers into the 1986 rules. 204 Decrees entered after Decem-
ber 31, 1986 fall under the 1986 rules with no opportunity to
elect otherwise.205
Treas. Regs. § 1.71-1(b) (1986).
201 1954 Code 99 71(a)(2) and 71(a)(3).
202 See supra text accompanying note 84-85.
203 Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(1) (1960). The regulations refer to the provisions and section
numbers of the 1954 Code. However, with the exception of the types of payments that
could fall under the payor deduction/payee inclusion scheme, the substantive rules
created by the 1942 Act did not change with the 1954 Code. The basic change was in
the numbering of the sections. See supra note 76.
204 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-IT(e) (1984).
205 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1843(c)(2), 100 Stat. 2085, 2853.
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HeinOnline  -- 26 Harv. J. on Legis. 163 1989
Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 26:117
B. Payments Made Under Written Separation Agreements or
Court-Ordered Support Decrees
Ignoring modifications which can move payments into later
systems, payments made under written separation agreements
or court-ordered support decrees fall under one of four systems.
Where the court-ordered decree of separate maintenance was
entered before March 1, 1954, payments fall under the Gould
system. The same is true for written separation agreements
executed before August 16, 1954.206
Payments made under a written separation agreement will fall
under the 1942 Act as amended in 1954 provided that either the
agreement was: (1) executed after August 16, 1954; or, was
(2) executed before that date but modified after August 16,
1954.207 Payments under court-ordered decrees of support follow
the same pattern as written separation agreements except that
the key date for support decrees is March 1, 1954.208 Court
ordered support decrees and written separation agreements en-
tered into or executed between January 1, 1985 and December
31, 1986, produce payments which fall under the 1984 Act;2
0 9
but those entered after December 31, 1986 fall under the 1986
Act.
2 10
Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(2)(i) (1960) (payments made under a written separation
agreement executed prior to August 16, 1954); Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(3)(i) (1960) (pay-
ments made under a court ordered decree for support entered into before March 1,
1954).
207 Treas. Reg § 1.71-1(b)(2)(ii) (1986).
208 1954 Code § 71(a)(3). A decree or written separation agreement is treated as
executed between 1954 and December 31, 1984 if any of the following are applicable:
(1) the decree or agreement was actually executed between those dates, Treas. Reg.
§§ 1.71 l(b)(2) (1960) and 1.71-1(b)(3) (1960); (2) the decree or agreement, although
actually executed after December 31, 1984, incorporates or adopts without change the
terms of a decree or agreement executed before January 1, 1985, Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.71-IT(e) (1984); or, (3) the decree or agreement, although actually executed before
the applicable 1954 dates, was materially altered or modified between 1954 and 1985,
Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(2)(ii) (1960). The 1942 rules apply to payments made under a
decree of divorce or separation entered before January 1, 1985. Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.71-IT(e) (1984).
2 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1T(e) (1984). An instrument is treated as executed be-
tween these dates if: (1) actually executed during this period (unless a decree executed
after December 31, 1984, incorporates or adopts without change the alimony or separate
maintenance payments of an instrument executed before January 1, 1985); (2) although
executed prior to December 31, 1984, the terms of alimony or separate maintenance
payments are changed by an instrument executed after that date; or, (3) the instrument
is expressly modified to provide that the Tax Reform Act of 1984 applies. Id.
210 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1843(c)(2), 100 Stat. 2085, 2854-
55. An instrument is treated as executed after December 31, 1986, if: (1) actually
executed after that date; or, (2) executed before January 1, 1987, but expressly modified
after December 31, 1986 to fall within the provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
Id.
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III. EVALUATING THE ALIMONY TAX SYSTEMS
What does this review of the alimony tax system reveal about
the present state of alimony taxation? First, the system is tre-
mendously complex. This complexity is undesirable in an area
of the law affecting so many unsophisticated taxpayers, and
should be reduced. But, before an effort is made to simplify the
system, an understanding of what gave rise to the complexity
is necessary. One cause of the complexity is the existence of
multiple alimony tax systems. Congress could easily remedy
this problem by adopting a single unified system of alimony
taxation. Simply discarding the multiple systems and replacing
them with a single model, though, will solve only part of the
problem.
From 1913 to the present, each system has shared one com-
mon feature: the use of a two transfer/single tax model as op-
posed to a two transfer/two tax approach. Rather than causing
complexity however, the single tax model actually simplifies the
tax because there is only one taxable event, rather than two.
Further, at least in theory, the single tax approach leaves more
after-tax income for the family unit because the overall tax
burden is lower than under a two transfer/two tax approach.
21'
Therefore, the single tax approach is not the villain in this
drama.
Since 1942, all alimony systems have shared another comnifon
feature: all allow income to be split between divorced spouses.
It is this income splitting feature that catses almost all of the
complexity in the present divorce tax systems, primarily by
necessitating that each system distinguish between spouse Stip-
port5 property settlements and child support. These distinctions
require the complex rules reviewed above. As this Article dem-
onstrates, it is the need to distinguish these payments that has
plagued alimony taxation.
The complexity caused by the income splitting rules is elim-
inated by returning to the single tax model adopted by the
Supreme Court in Gould v. Gould.2 12 Under the Gould approach,
the payee receives an alimony exelusion While the payor is
denied an alimony deduction. Because the entire tax burden
21i For ti discussion of the reduced tax burden prottced by a two trafsfet/single tax
inodel as opposed to the classic two thansfer/tw6 tax model see supra t6kt at floteg 24-
32.
21, See supra notes 7-15 and accompanying text,
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rests with one taxpayer, there is no need to distinguish alimony
from other forms of support and the confusing front-loading
rules of section 71(f) become obsolete. The fact that income
splitting causes complexity, however, is not enough standing
alone to justify the elimination of this feature of the alimony tax
system. It is important to evaluate whether placing the tax
burden on the payor comports with both the modern view of
alimony and current income tax policy. With this in mind, there
are five possible objections to returning to the alimony exclusion
of pre-1942 law.
(a) An alimony exclusion violates our statutory scheme by
allowing the payee to completely escape taxation. One objec-
tion to Gould is that an alimony exclusion allows payees to
completely escape taxation. At first glance, allowing payees to
receive tax-free alimony seems logically inconsistent with the
Code's assertion that all accessions to wealth are subject to
tax.2 13 However, closer examination reveals that the alimony
exclusion is actually the logical result of the two transfer/single
tax approach endorsed by all alimony taxation systems since
1913. By adopting the single tax approach, Congress chose not
to exercise its power to tax all income from whatever source
derived where alimony payments are at issue. Taxing the payee
is inconsistent with the single tax approach because it subjects
alimony payments to a double tax.
Under a two transfer/two tax system the payee should be
taxed on amounts received as alimony because this model as-
sumes that every transfer should generate a tax, even if the
monies used to pay an obligation have been taxed once before. 214
Once Congress adopted a two transfer/single tax model, it be-
came difficult to justify taxing the payee. Given that the objec-
tive of a single tax system is to tax income once and only once,
the view that the payee should be taxed on alimony must come
from the belief that amounts received as alimony have never
been taxed before. But is this notion accurate in the context of
marriage, divorce and the joint return?
There are two ways of viewing an alimony payment. Either
it is a repayment of property paid into a marital partnership or
213 I.R.C. § 61 (1986) subjects all income "from whatever source derived" to taxation.
214 See supra text accompanying note 9.
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it is a payment of support. Under either view, a single tax system
cannot coexist with a tax on the payee.
The partnership view of marriage underlies the community
property system, 2 5 is relied on by some courts, 216 and is advo-
cated by many family law commentators. 217 According to this
theory, a spouse who devotes her productive efforts to home-
making and childrearing during a marriage invests in her
spouse's earning capacity.2 8 By freeing her spouse to develop
occupational skills and experience in the conventional work-
force, the homemaker increases her husband's earning capacity
at the expense of her own. The longer the marriage (and the
longer the homemaker remains outside the workforce) the more
she invests. Therefore, when a marriage of long duration dis-
solves, the homemaker has a property right to the capital she
invested in the marital partnership.
Current divorce law implicitly supports this view. The Uni-
form Marriage and Divorce Act,2 19 and most state divorce stat-
utes direct courts to consider "duration of marriage" as an im-
portant factor in determining alimony payments. 220 Empirical
evidence demonstrates that duration of marriage tends to in-
crease the amount of the alimony award. 22' In addition, many
state divorce statutes cite the homemaker's contribution to the
marriage as a factor in fixing the amount of an alimony award.
222
215 L. WEITZMAN, supra note 129, at 4-5.
216 See, e.g., Marcus v. Marcus, 135 A.D.2d 216, 525 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1988) (relative
economic and non-economic contributions to lengthy marital partnership considered in
determining distribution of marital assets); Woodward v. Woodward, 477 So.2d 631 (Fla.
App. 1985) (trial court erred in awarding wife greater share of marital assets where
parties were true marital partners in all respects throughout marriage, including share
of workload and benefits of partnership).
217 McLindon, The Economic Disaster of Divorce for Women, 21 FAM. L.Q. 351, 394
(1987); Note, Pension Awards in Divorce and Bankruptcy, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 194,
196-99 (1988).
218 A spouse who works part-time in a job that does not enable her to realize her full
earning capacity so that she may bear primary responsibility for homemaking activities
similarly invests in her husband's earning capacity.
A 1978 survey of divorced men and women in Los Angeles County revealed that 68%
of women and 54% of men endorsed the sharing of partnership assets as a rationale for
rewarding alimony. That is to say, a majority of both sexes agreed that if a woman
helped her husband "get ahead because they are really partners in his work," the woman
deserves alimony if the marriage dissolves. L. WEITZMAN, supra note 129, at 151.
219 UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 308(b)(4), 9A U.L.A. 147 (1987).
220 E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10 114(2)(d) (1987); FLA. STAT. § 61.08(2)(b) (1985);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 504(b)(4) (Supp. 1988).
22 According to a random sample of Los Angeles County court records compiled by
Weitzman in 1977, the median monthly award rose from $100 for marriages of one to
four years to $299 for marriages of over fifteen years duration. L. WEITZMAN, supra
note 129, at 172.
222 E.g., FLA. STAT. § 61.08(2)(f) (1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6 5(a)(6) (1982); MAss.
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If marriage is a partnership in which each spouse contributes
to the production of income, then how is jointly-earned income
taxed? Some of it is subject to tax in the year earned (such as
salary earned outside the marriage and brought into the marriage
to be shared by the spouses), while some of it should never be
taxed given the exclusions accepted as part of the modern in-
come tax system (such as the exclusion for imputed income
derived from homemaking services). To the extent that this
partnership income is subject to tax, it is taxed to both the
husband and the wife through the use of the joint return. 223 Thus,
combining a marital partnership analysis with the mechanics of
the joint return prompts the conclusion that when a payee is
awarded alimony she is not awarded future income (i.e., a right
to share in income which has yet to be earned and taxed).
Rather, she is being repaid monies which she earned in the past
and invested in the marital partnership. These repaid funds were
either taxed to her in the past through the joint return or should
never be subject to tax because they represent income which
enjoys an exclusion. Alimony is more like a division of property,
therefore, than it is a payment of income.224 When we look at
alimony in this way, it becomes clear that, under a single tax
system, the payee should not be taxed on alimony because to
do so would subject the income to a double tax (if it was pre-
viously taxed as in the case of salary), or to an impermissible
single tax (if the payment represehts repayment of excluded
income as in the case of homemaking services).
No ofie made this argument when Cortgress shifted the ali-
mony tax burderi from the payor to the payee because the joint
return did not exist in 1942 (when the burden Was shifted) and
therefore, It Was harder to argue that both the husband and the
wife paid tax oii income earned during the mafriage, Without
the Joint return, the husband arid wife each paid a separate tax
on their separate (for tax purposes) income. Thus, it did not
seem as though the payee had already paid tax on these sums.
The advent of the joint return, however, made it clear that the
payee hag already satisfied her tax obligation-now both hus-
band and wife are liable for the amount of tax due on the joint
GEN. LAws ANN, ch. 208, § j4 (West 1987)' TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-5-101(d)(9) (Supp,
1988),
For a discussion of the joint return see sttpra text aceonipanying flotes 74 - 76,
224 %e L, WEItZMAN, suprn tlote 129, at 360 (alimorly represents the repaynlent for
the ifivestflint in human capithl).
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return. 225 In the context of a single tax system, the tax has
already been paid. Given this payment, a single tax alimony
system cannot require that the payee include alimony in income.
(b) Alimony as support. An alternative way to view alimony
is not as a repayment of marital property, but rather as support.
This approach acknowledges the reality that the women who
are most often awarded alimony are those who lack the occu-
pational skills and education to be immediately self-sufficient.
226
Because they have relied on their husbands' promise to support
them economically, they have foregone the training and career
building that would enable them to be self-sufficient. 227 A hus-
band who encourages his wife to remain a housewife while he
pursues a career, assuring her a share of his economic gain,
cannot change the rules of the game once the wife's sacrifice is
made, While a husband's personal obligation to support his wife
may not last forever, it should last until a woman is self-
sufficient.
State divorce statutes and courts give credence to this view.
The goal of modern alimony is mainly rehabilitative-it provides
women with financial support while they acquire the education
and job skills that will increase their employability and earning
capacity. The legal system clearly expects divorced women to
become self sufficient, except where women are near retirement
age at the time of their divorce. 228 In fact, the Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act (and state statutes patterned after it) make lack
of self-sufficiency a prerequisite for alimony,229 and, courts uni-
formly examine the capacity of a spouse to provide for herself
21 For the joint liability of spouses using the joint return see I.R.C. § 6013 (1986).
There is a limited exception to this joint liability for innocent spouses (i.e., those who
did not know of the income and did not benefit from it). I.R.C. § 6013(e) (1986).
22,' L. WEITZMAN, supra note 129, at 176-77.
227 For a discussion of the opportunity costs of homemaking, see Beninger & Smith,
Career Opportunity Costs: A Factor in Spousal Support Determinations, 16 FAM. L.Q.
203 (1982).
218 See, e.g., Reback v. Reback, 296 So.2d 541 (Fla. App. 1974) (holding grant of only
rehabilitative alimony to 56-year-old wife who had not been employed since 1945
improper).
22 UNF. MAktAGP AND Divokpc ACT § 308, 9A U.L.A. 147 (1987). See, e.g.,
COLO. REV. SirAT. § 14-10-14(1) (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1512(b) (1981); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 40, para, 504(a) (Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. § 518.552 (Supp. 1988);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-203(1) (1987).
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before awarding alimony.230 If alimony is viewed as support,
then the payor spouse should not receive an alimony paid de-
duction; support is a personal expense of the payor spouse and,
as such, should be included in the payor's income.231 Thus, if
alimony is support, then the single tax model can only be main-
tained by excluding alimony from the payee's income.
(c) An undue burden on payors? A return to the Gould ap-
proach is likely to be criticized on the ground that denying
payors an alimony deduction would leave husbands with insuf-
ficient income to meet both personal needs and income tax
obligations. 232 This argument fails because courts do consider
the husband's ability to pay in determining the propriety and
amount of an alimony award.2 33 Further, the overall frequency
of alimony awards has dropped since the advent of no- fault
divorce.2 4 Thus, alimony awards are made only when courts
believe that husbands will have sufficient after tax income to
support themselves. 235
230 E.g., Hall v. Hall, 363 So. 2d 137 (Fla. App. 1978) (where wife was thirty-eight
years of age, in good health and had briefly utilized a teaching degree from another
state, the trial judge correctly perceived an opportunity for wife to be self-sufficient
after obtaining a Florida teaching certificate, therefore rehabilitative alimony was ap-
propriate until certificate obtained); In re Marriage of Weinberg, 125 I11. App. 3d 904,
466 N.E.2d 925 (1984) (alimony proper where petitioner did not possess sufficient liquid
assets or marketable skills to provide for herself or her children); Abuzzahab v. Abuz-
zahab, 359 N.W.2d 12 (Minn. 1984) (trial court erred in awarding permanent spousal
support where wife's ability to support herself was established by record).
I" I.R.C. § 262 (1986) dictates that personal and family expenses are not deductible
from income. See supra note I 1 and accompanying text.
232 This argument was made in favor of the payor deduction/payee inclusion scheme
in 1942. H.R. REP. No. 2333, supra note 29 at 409.
233 E.g., Hanson v. Hanson, 404 N.W.2d 460 (N.D. 1987) (upholding trial court order
that husband pay wife lump sum of $10,000 where the husband's earnings ability was
substantially greater than that of wife); In re Marriage of Weinberg, 466 N.E. 2d at 933
(former husband's earnings adequate to meet expenses of both himself and his ex-wife).
2 The overall frequency of alimony awards in California dropped significantly when
the no-fault law went into effect. Thus, between 1968 and 1972, the percentage of wives
awarded alimony dropped from 20 percent to 15 percent of the divorce cases in both
San Francisco and Los Angeles counties. L. WEITZMAN, supra note 129, at 167.
25 In one study, only 15 percent of men who earned less that $20,000 per year were
ordered to pay alimony, in contrast to 62 percent of husbands who earned $30,000 or
more. Since only 17 percent of the divorced men in this study reported gross incomes
greater than $20,000, it appears that courts view the bulk of divorced men as incapable
of paying alimony. L. WEITZMAN, supra note 129, at 167. Even when alimony is
awarded, the amount of the award is relatively small; the United States Bureau of the
Census reports that the mean average income from alimony in 1985 was only $3,733.
See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMM., STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 1988 (Table No. 358).
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(d) The tax benefits of income splitting. Another objection
to, Gould is that the primary advantage of income splitting comes
from a reduction in a couple's total tax liability. This overall
reduction in total tax due, however, can only take place in the
context of a progressive rate structure. 236 In other words, the
tax saving benefits of income splitting are severely reduced, if
not completely eliminated, once a progressive. rate system is
replaced with a fiat or modified fiat tax. 237 This distinction is
important because, although this country has operated under a
progressive tax structure for most of the seventy-five years of
the modem income tax, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 moved
America to a modified fiat tax.238 As a result of the compressed
rates adopted by the 1986 Act, the effect of progressive rates
becomes less important and the potential tax savings from in-
come splitting is reduced, if not eliminated, for many
Americans.
Even if income splitting does reduce a couple's total tax in
some situations, this extra income will not necessarily be shared
by the couple. Income splitting only provides an opportunity-
not an obligation-to share in any extra after-tax income which
might be generated. This opportunity is still subject to the pay-
ee's ability to successfully negotiate for a portion of those extra
funds. There is evidence to the show that women do not do well
in these types of negotiations. 2 9 Thus, the primary effect of the
income split is to give more after-tax income to men rather than
creating more money for the couple and its children to share.
(e) Equality as fairness. Finally, though the single tax system
supports an alimony exclusion, there are still those who will
argue that denying payors an alimony paid deduction violates
notions of equality between men and women. This prompts the
236 For a discussion of the tax saving results of a single tax system combined with
income splitting, see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
z7 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
238 See I.R.C. § 1 (1986) (rates for individuals now generally fall into two main tax
brackets, 15% and 28%, with income under $17,850 falling in the 15% category for
single taxpayers.
139 See, e.g., L. WEITZMAN, supra note 129, at 310-18. What little bargaining power
women have in the divorce situation they use in order to keep custody of their children,
rather than to increase their support awards. This is because the divorce laws do not
require alimony to be awarded in most situations and most court awards tend to be
modest. Id. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 235. If a husband knows that he
will pay little alimony if he contests a settlement in court, he has no incentive to concede
a share of the tax benefits of income splitting during an alimony settlement negotiation.
1989]
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question whether treating people equally is the same as treating
people fairly.240 In the context of divorce it appears that equality
and fairness are two distinct and incompatible notions.
The reality of divorce is that it often throws women into
poverty without a social or legal "safety net."241 Given this
situation, should the Internal Revenue Code provide the final
blow by taxing income to wives rather than husbands? It seems
that the better result is to tax those with the greatest ability to
pay and allow couples to fix payments based on the knowledge
that the payor will bear the tax burden. If couples can negotiate
a fair result when both sides pay the tax, then they should be
able to also negotiate when only one spouse pays the tax. The
difference is that women will come to these negotiations with
some of the bargaining power that the 1942 alimony system and
the 1948 joint return took away from them.242
V. CONCLUSION
The alimony tax system evolved through a series of policy
choices. First, the Supreme Court chose to adopt a two transfer/
single tax approach rather than the two transfer/two tax model
originally advocated by the Internal Revenue Service, thereby
choosing to treat divorced couples as a single tax unit rather
than as two separate taxpayers. 24 3 This result was firmly
grounded in the conception of marriage as a lifelong union.244
240 See, e.g., Prager, Sharing Principles and the Future of Marital Property Law, 25
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1, 5-6 and 11-14 (1977). (Given a perfect system where there is no
discrimination, it may be possible to treat men and women equally; however, the realities
of social norms makes this choice unfeasible.); Blum, Sexism in the Code: A Compar-
ative Study of Income Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFrALO L. Rav.
49 (1971) (treatment of men and women equally through the use of the joint return
results in women being treated unfairly because their income becomes subject to higher
marginal rates of tax).
24' Weitzman shows that women's income drops as much as 73% after a divorce while
the income of divorced husband climbs by about 42%. L. WEITZMAN, supra note 129,
at 323. See also McLindon, supra note 501.
242 For a discussion of the loss of bargaining power to women, see supra text accom-
panying note 81.
243 Under the two tax model originally suggested by the Commissioner, there Is no
need to determine the proper taxpayer because both spouses pay tax.
24 See L. WEITZMAN, supra note 129, at 367.
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In next deciding who to tax, the Supreme Court determined
that the payor must bear the complete alimony tax burden.
245
This result was consistent with the Court's view that husbands
had a lifelong obligation to support their wives. This alimony
tax treatment was simple to apply but some questioned its fair-
ness. After nearly three decades, during which it became more
common for women to be independent wage earners and tax-
payers, Congress shifted the alimony tax burden to the payee.
Thus, under three of the four present divorce tax systems,
alimony is taxable to the payee while other payments-such as
child support-remain taxable to the payor.
24 6
The second issue raised by the two transfer/one tax model is
which payments will be taxed to which spouse. The simplest
solution to this problem is to choose one spouse to bear the
entire tax burden. Instead, Congress restricted the payee's tax
obligation to spouse support payments, leaving the payor with
the burden for other payments. This added a layer of complexity
to the divorce tax system that was not present under Gould and
Davis. Congress then exacerbated the problem by including
optional grandfather clauses in each wave of tax reform after
1942. As a result, payments are taxed under a variety of rules
depending on when the original dissolution took place and
whether the divorce instrument was modified so as to fall under
a different set of rules. Because of Congress' inability to bring
all alimony payments within a single unified system-as it did
for decrees of divorce and separation in 1942-the alimony tax
rules have become a trap for the unwary taxpayer and practi-
tioner alike.
In addition, because payees are usually women and payors
are usually men, shifting the tax on alimony to payees meant
that the overall tax burden on women increased while it de-
creased for men. Given the economic hardship that women
suffer because of divorce this was not necessarily the fair result.
Further, with its expansion of the divorce tax system in 1954,
Congress continued this policy by expanding the categories of
245 The complete tax burden on the payor comes from a combination of the Gould
decision (which makes the payor responsible for the tax generated by support payments)
and the holding in Davis (which makes the payor responsible for the tax on gains
generated by the use of appreciated property to pay for the relinquishment of marital
rights).
246 Payments made under written separation agreements and court ordered support
decrees entered into before 1954 and not modified to fall within later rules are still taxed
to the payor. See supra text accompanying note 206.
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payees caught in the system without providing them with suffi-
cient negotiating power to offset the increased tax liability. This
shift in the tax burden of divorce was completed in 1984 when
Congress made payees liable for tax on the built-in appreciation
in property transferred as part of a divorce settlement.
Whether alimony is viewed as a return of capital to which the
payee spouse has a property right, or as support for those who
lack the skills to be self-sufficient, the Gould tax treatment of
alimony is most equitable, theoretically correct and straightfor-
ward. A return to the Gould approach also has the practical
advantage of eliminating the need to distinguish alimony from
other distributions incident to divorce, thereby enabling Con-
gress to get rid of the complicated front-loading, periodic pay-
ment and lump-sum rules. If alimony is a distribution of prop-
erty, it should not be taxed when distributed-to do so would
impose a tax on income that has already gone through the
income tax system. If alimony is support, it should not be
taxable to the payee, for it is in discharge of a personal obligation
of the payor.
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